On the Discount in Foreclosure Sales: Theory and RCT Evidence from Sweden
2025 (English)Conference paper, Oral presentation with published abstract (Refereed)
Abstract [en]
Foreclosure is the forcible sale of real estate properties to pay debts. Earlier research indicates that foreclosed properties are sold at a discount. Since these studies typically rely on observational data that compares forced sales with (non-forced) open market sales, they quite likely suffer from selection problems. Furthermore, the mode of sale as an explanation for foreclosure discount is often overlooked. We add to the literature on foreclosure discount in three ways.
First, we use an RCT-designed field experiment, run in cooperation with the Swedish Enforcement Authority over a three-year period (2019-2022) to evaluate if brokered sales outperform auction sales. We find that brokers beat auctions and that their sale prices were 14 percent higher compared to the auction sales. In addition, we find a foreclosure discount in the auction mode, where the sale price is substantially below the assessed market value. For the brokered sale, we do not find such a discount.
Second, building on the idea that there are many barriers to attending, participating, and buying in the auction that are absent in the brokered sale, we provide a theory that the auction discount can in part be due to uncompetitive bidding in the auction by professional buyers (i.e., there is collusion).
Finally, using historical data on foreclosure sales, we provide evidence for our theoretical mechanism.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2025.
Keywords [en]
Foreclosure, foreclosure discount, sales mode, auction theory, field experiment
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:miun:diva-55455OAI: oai:DiVA.org:miun-55455DiVA, id: diva2:1994728
Conference
2025 World Congress of the Econometric Society (ESWC 2025), Seoul, Korea, 18-22 August, 2025.
Projects
On the Functioning of the Swedish Housing Market: Evidence from Two Field Experiments (Handelsbankens forskningsstiftelser, anslagsnummer: P23-0120, prinicpal investigator: Mattias Nordin)
Funder
Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation and Tore Browaldh Foundation, P23-01202025-09-032025-09-032025-09-25Bibliographically approved