This article critically examines the judgments issued by the Migration Court in Stockholm, particularly focusing on cases involving adolescent asylum applicants converted from Islam to Christianity. Drawing upon Max Weber's conceptualization of substantive rationality and substantial irrationality, this research explores the interplay between these elements within the court's decision-making process and the substantive rationality of asylum seekers, particularly how each party navigates complex value systems in the context of asylum claims. In the context of assessing credibility in conversion-based asylum claims in migration courts, substantive rationality entails applying general criteria consistently to evaluate asylum applicants' credibility based on objective evidence, while also acknowledging that individuals may prioritize their values over their legal conformity, as seen in the case of asylum applicant converts. The Court's credibility assessments, while intended to determine the trustworthiness of asylum claims, can lead to substantively irrational outcomes due to subjective judgment and overemphasis on written evidence. Politically appointed lay judges further complicate the decision-making process, often resulting in dissenting opinions from professional judges. In conclusion, while the court's decision-making process may appear rationalized through administrative procedures, it often embodies substantial irrationality in its disregard for the challenges faced by asylum applicant converts and the subjective biases of decision-makers.