Model-Based Stealth Attack to Networked Control System Based on Real-Time EthernetShow others and affiliations
2021 (English)In: IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics, ISSN 0278-0046, E-ISSN 1557-9948, Vol. 68, no 8, p. 7672-7683, article id 9119766Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]
In this article, industrial control systems include networked control systems (NCS), which use real-time Ethernet (RTE) protocols since many years, well before the time sensitive networking initiative debut. Today, ethernet-based control systems are used all across Industry 4.0, including in critical applications, allowing for straight integration with information technology layers. Even if it is known that current RTE protocols do not have strong authentication or ciphering options, it is still very challenging to perform undetected cyber-attacks to these protocols while the NSC is in operation, in particular because such attacks must comply with very strict and small temporal constraints. In this article, a model-based attack is proposed for service degradation of NCS. The attack is carried out in real-time and it can remain undetected for the entire plant life. The attack can be applied to any RTE protocols and, without loss of generality, a detailed analysis of stealth techniques is provided for a specific real use case based on PROFINET. The experimental results demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed attack and its high effectiveness. The article also points out some possible future investigation directions in order to mitigate the attack. © 1982-2012 IEEE.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. , 2021. Vol. 68, no 8, p. 7672-7683, article id 9119766
Keywords [en]
Industrial control system (ICS), networked control system (NCS), PROFINET, real-time Ethernet (RTE), security, Ethernet, Network security, Real time systems, Critical applications, Industrial control systems, Possible futures, Real time Ethernet, Service degradation, Stealth technique, Strong authentication, Temporal constraints, Networked control systems
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:miun:diva-43052DOI: 10.1109/TIE.2020.3001850ISI: 000647484000121Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85105638568OAI: oai:DiVA.org:miun-43052DiVA, id: diva2:1595664
Note
Cited By :1; Export Date: 20 September 2021; Article; CODEN: ITIED; Correspondence Address: Ferrari, P.; Department of Information Engineering, Italy; email: paolo.ferrari@unibs.it
2021-09-202021-09-202023-08-28Bibliographically approved