



## CONTEXTUAL IMPACT ON NEW PARTY ENTRANCE

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### ABSTRACT

Although much of the first half of the 20th century was affected by major events such as war and dictatorship, the party systems of the Western Europe stayed quite static. In the words of Lipset and Rokkan, the party systems had frozen and were still in the middle of the 1960s a reflection of the cleavage structures which dominated the first decades of the century. Somewhat ironically, just years after their study was published, an explosion of new parties entering national parliaments took place more or less all over Western Europe. This enlightens the need for understanding why and when new parties enter national parliaments for the first time.

This study shows that the cross-national variation between the West European countries are significant and that all three Scandinavian countries can be labelled as low-scorers when it comes to number new parties in their national parliaments. The survey also shows that more new parties have entered during the latter part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century than during the 1960s and 1970s.

Three different types of factors, institutional, societal and economic, are tested to explain the cross-country variations. Overall the analysis gives weak results. Some institutions and economic indicators seem to explain at least some of the variance. But most of these factors, for instance electoral system, and the societal conditions seem to be of little importance. The main conclusion drawn from this is the difficulty of explaining new party entrance with the use of system-level analysis. In-depth case studies can perhaps be a more appropriate way to get an understanding of when new parties enter national parliaments.

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## Introduction

In the representative form of democracy, which dominates today's western liberal countries, the political parties play a very important role. In many ways, they shape a country's political landscape (Dahl 1998:130). Sometimes this is referred to as party democracy (Strøm and Müller 1999; Johansson et al. 2005). From the establishment of universal suffrage during the first decades of the 20th century until the middle of 1960s, the numbers of new political parties in Western Europe were fairly limited. Following this, Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) raised the theory of the frozen party system. In their study, they claimed that the 1960s party system was a reflection of the 1920s party system and the cleavage structures of the beginning of the 20th century.<sup>1</sup> Despite major events, such as the Second World War, very few parties had entered the political market in these 40 years. Yet it did not take long after the study was published before Lipset's and Rokkan's observation became more of a historical description. More and more parties succeeded in winning sufficient votes to enter the national parliaments. This has resulted in much more complex west European party systems than just a couple of decades ago.

The pattern of increasingly more dynamic party systems is also applicable to the Scandinavian scene. During the post war period to the beginning of the 1970s the party systems of Denmark, Norway and Sweden all were static. Due to the fact that each of these systems have been dominated by five parties, representing five distinct party groups, the Scandinavian five party model has been introduced in the literature (Berglund and Lindström 1978). The stable systems however, have all changed.<sup>2</sup> In both Denmark and Norway the transformation started during the 1970s. In the "earthquake election" held in 1973, the number of parties in the Danish Folketing raised from five to eleven. Three of these were parties never previously represented in the national parliament. Just a few months earlier, a similar development had taken place in Norway. Here, two never previously represented parties joined the Storting. Although Sweden arguably could be seen as the Scandinavian country with the most frozen party system (Arter 1999), the composition of its party system finally was altered there as well. In the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, three new parties entered the Riksdag, making the Scandinavian five party model a picture of the past. However, although the three Scandinavian countries often are treated as most similar systems, the explosion of new parties during the post 1970 period has not affected these countries equally. In a descriptive study in the late 1990s, Peter Mair (1999) recognized nine new parliamentary parties in Denmark during the period 1960-1998. The

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<sup>1</sup> Others have however, argued that the party systems never were frozen. See for instance Shamir (1984).

<sup>2</sup> See however Sundberg (1999), who argues that the core of the Scandinavian party system still is frozen according to the Lipset and Rokkan hypothesis.

corresponding numbers for Norway was five and only three for Sweden. Hence, despite the often asserted similarity between these countries they show quite different outcomes when it comes to new parties.

To understand the different outcomes I will in this study conduct a cross-country analysis. Using insights from an analysis on the West European countries, the variation within Scandinavia can be better understood.

### **What is the problem?**

In focus of this study is the question of when new parties enter national parliaments for the first time. The question is related to other questions already studied. However, I argue that although the prior research in some ways gives us hints of where to look for the answer, it is of greatest interest to separate the issue and perform an analysis with particular focus on under what circumstances new parties easiest get elected. The related issues earlier studied can in broad lines be divided into two separate areas. First, there is research on when new parties form. Second, the electoral success of new parties is studied. The bulk of the literature primarily focuses on the formation, but some of these also deal with the electoral performance. With this study I intend to contribute with the missing piece of the puzzle. That is, there is research on when new parties form and what factors influence their performance in elections, but we do not know under what circumstances they get enough electoral support to for the first time get represented.

In short, this paper has three objectives. First, the evolution of the West European party systems will be mapped. What are the spatial and temporal trends? Are there areas and periods where new parties seem to be more frequent than other?

Second, the cross-country variation shall be examined. Here, three types of factors will be analyzed. Which impacts have institutional, economic and societal factors on new party entrance?

The third and final objective is to apply the insights from the cross-country study on the Scandinavian countries.

It is important to note that contextual factors cannot explain the full picture. They only make the entrance for new parties more or less difficult. I therefore argue for in-depth studies of individual parties to complement the picture which can be yielded through a study of this character. However, this is out of the scope for this study.

## What is a new party?

Before we go any further, it is of greatest importance to define the object under study. In methodological terms we need to identify the population (Gerring forthcoming 2007). Especially when it comes to studies engaged in new parties, the memorable words of a Swedish political scientist seem to be more than applicable.

[I]t has often proved difficult to decide whether different researchers have said the same thing concerning the same phenomena, different things concerning the same phenomena, or different things about different phenomena (Sjöblom 1968:6).

Indeed, there is no unified definition of a new party. The following review, however, serve as the fundament of how the term is used throughout this study.

Harmel (1985:405) identifies three different ways to look upon new parties. First, a party formed for fighting over new issues can be considered to be a new party. These parties contribute by expressing new cleavage dimensions in the party system. A second way of defining new is in relation to a certain historic event. Parties can be divided into old parties, founded before this certain event, and new parties, founded after the same event. Finally, new parties can be defined as those added to the original party system of a country. This last definition, of course, requires a definition of which parties can be considered to be members of the original party system.

These three different interpretations of new parties are neither complete nor clear definitions. They all have in common the reference to new parties in the meaning of newly *formed* parties.

Both Mair (1999:210) and Erlingsson (2005:52) use a definition similarly to Harmel's last interpretation of new party. That is, a new party is defined as a party not originally a member of the once consolidated party system. In addition, they also distinguish different types of new parties. In general, new parties emerge in three different ways. Parties can emerge as a consequence of a merger of one or more established parties. Second, parties might form as a consequence of a split.<sup>3</sup> Sometimes a split results in the death of the original party. However, it is just as possible that the original party lives on, side by side with the new party. Finally, there are new parties that are genuinely new. This implies that they did form as a consequence of neither a fusion nor a split (Mair 1999:216). In addition to these three categories, Erlingsson also includes electoral alliances as one kind of new party.

Electoral alliances as well as mergers differ in an important aspect from splits and genuinely new parties. While the latter contribute to an addition of contestants to the electoral race, alliances and mergers can be seen as reorganized established parties. That is, old contestants in a new shape. The emerging of the genuinely new parties and splits results in an expanded party

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<sup>3</sup> Mair (1990) has in an earlier article used the terms fissions and fusion to denote splits and mergers respectively.

system, which can be seen as a reaction to the actions taken (or not taken) by the established parties (Hug 2001). Alliances and mergers, on the other hand, are merely established parties who have reorganized in order to survive. Hence, it is highly likely that there are other explanations for the success of electoral alliances and mergers, compared to why splits and genuinely new parties can succeed (cf. Erlingsson 2005:52). Due to this, I will in this study only focus on the splits and genuinely new parties.

The distinction between a splinter and a genuinely new party is not always crystal clear. Despite the fact that new parties might “have drawn elements of both their leadership and active support from existing parties [...], they can nonetheless be regarded as genuinely novel” (Mair 1999:216). To distinguish a splinter from a genuinely new party, detailed knowledge is demanded. Since such knowledge is hardly possible to obtain for every party system, reliance on secondary sources is inevitable. Information obtained from such sources is not always easy to interpret.<sup>4</sup>

## **What do we know?**

The research on cross-national variation of new party success is dominated by an emphasis on the impact of institutions. Social and economic factors are not equally studied. Here, I intend to test if and in what way these different categories of contextual factors influence the chances of not previously represented parties to enter the national parliaments in the West European party systems. I start with a review of the most influential and all encompassing studies in the area.

As I mentioned above, new parties have been studied in a couple of different ways. Apart from being theoretically separated they can also be technically distinguished from each other. The dependent variable used in earlier studies differs and hence also the question which can be answered. I will here systematically review four of the most important studies in the area of new party research. I do this for two reasons. First, these are the basis for the accumulated knowledge in the area and will therefore serve as the main sources for the development of the hypotheses tested in this study. Second, it will pinpoint the importance of identifying the dependent variable and what consequences this might have for what answers that are possible to get.

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<sup>4</sup> Consider the Swedish party, the June List, which ran and surprised many in the European parliament election in 2004. The founders of the party had political experience from, among others, the Social Democrats. But since they did not hold high positions and the new party can hardly be perceived to be a closely related party to the Social Democrats ideologically, it may be misleading to refer to the June List as a splinter. More correctly, the party may be referred to as a genuinely new party. However, this judgement demands in-depth knowledge. A researcher not familiar with small parties in Sweden might be led, as a consequence of the leaders' former Social Democratic membership, to think of the June List as a splinter. Yet another Swedish example is the Feministic Initiative (Fi). One of this party's spokespersons and founders, Gudrun Schyman is a former party leader of the Left Party. Nonetheless, neither this can be considered to be a split. Although Fi is seen as a party of the left it is not a successor to the Left Party and has a platform of its own.

One of the first studies which in a systematic way studied new parties were conducted by Hauss and Rayside (1978). In their study, the authors interchangeably use the terms emergence, formation and development of new parties. Hence, the study primarily tries to explain why new parties are born. Their dependent variable however, could be described as measuring whether a party has reached success or not. In their analysis they study 23 cases. The cases is either actual parties or the absence of a party from three different party groups. For instance, in the group of ethnic/linguistic parties they studied both “some of the most successful [...] new parties” and “the failures of American blacks and French Bretons to form their own parties” (Hauss and Rayside 1978:33). Although this makes it a little difficult to actually know what they are measuring, their study is interesting.

Hauss and Rayside reflect on three different groups of explanations. First, they evaluate the importance of sharpening cleavages and strains in society. They argue, quite convincingly, that the existences of these are necessary but not sufficient for new parties to emerge. Since there in almost all of the studied countries are cleavages which had failed to bring new successful parties, this argument seems to be intuitively right. In their study however, Hauss and Rayside do not recognize the supply capacity of new parties. That is, it might be possible for new parties to raise new issues, not previously demanded by society.

Neither the second group of explanations, institutional facilitators, is according to Hauss and Rayside, sufficient for the understanding. However, as with cleavages and strains, they do not count them as unimportant. A weakness in their study of institutions however, is their operationalization. The variables tested are too broad, which becomes evident in their analysis of the impact of the electoral system. Deducted from the laws of Duverger (1954), they hypothesize that a proportional electoral system would be beneficial for new parties. What exactly they mean by a proportional system is not that obvious however. As research has shown, it is not only the electoral formula that determines the proportionality of an electoral system (see below).

Finally, political facilitators are tested. Hauss and Rayside argue that the actions taken by the established parties are important for the new party's chances of success. Moreover, the new party itself has to have an effective leadership. Furthermore they argue in their study that a strong organizational base does not seem to be necessary in the initial phase.

Although the study of Hauss and Rayside was one of the first systematic expositions of new party success, it was of an explorative character. In sharp contrast, Harmel and Robertson (1985) make use of 233 cases in their analysis. Their study builds much on an accumulation of explanatory factors tested by other scholars. Using these, they focus on two questions: what conditions explain new party formation and new party success. The dependent variable for the

analysis of new party success is the new party's maximum share of the total votes in any of the elections it has competed in. This means that they are analyzing what factors can gain a new party as high vote percentage as possible.

As well as some hypotheses produced on their own, three sets of different explanatory factors are identified and tested. Social factors, derived from the understanding that new parties fill representational needs in society (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), are tested through data on country population, pluralism, heterogeneity and sectionalism. The analysis shows that these factors are important for the formation of new parties but *not* for the subsequent electoral success. The number of parties and the number of cleavage dimensions currently addressed in the party systems, which they denote political factors, show significance. However, contrary to what Harmel and Robertson hypothesized, new parties are more common in systems with many parties and cleavage dimensions already addressed. The only factor showing significance for new party success in the expected way is one of the structural factors, namely the election system. Similar to Hauss and Rayside, Harmel and Robertson's findings show that proportional electoral system are more beneficial for new parties than majority or plurality electoral system. But, as with the former study this study is not distinguishing the different aspects of an electoral system.

As with most of the studies on new parties, Simon Hug (2000; 2001), put most of his effort in explaining the formation of new parties. Nevertheless, he also produces some findings of interest for the understanding of new party success. Perhaps the most important contribution is a methodological note. Hug stresses the intimate link between a party's formation and its subsequent potential success. He argues that considerations made in advance of the electoral participation also are of interest to explain the entrance of new parties in parliament. Rules that facilitate or constrain new parties from participate in the election can have impact on whether the new party compete at all. Examples of such rules are monetary costs of registering a party and the number of signatures necessary to form a party (Tavits 2006). Empirically, Hug (2001) tests a game-theoretic model for the prediction of a new party's initial success. The dependent variable is the first electoral result for each new party. Hence, Hug explains how strong a party will be in its first time appearance at the ballots. A subsequent success (typically entrance to parliament) is not included in his study. Even though Hug includes established parties and the new party in his model, he argues also for the importance of a third actor. In order to predict the initial success, voters ought also to be taken into account. Partially, as a consequence of not including voters in the model, he argues only limited insights can be reached. Furthermore, the study tells us little about which factors are important to consider if we want to understand specifically why new parties break through, rather than how strong they become.

Finally, Hino (2006b; 2006a) has also contributed to the accumulated knowledge on new party success. In the study he analyzes three groups of new parties, extreme right parties, new politics parties and ethno-regionalist parties in Western Europe 1950-2004. Hino tests a theoretical model that builds on the study by Hauss and Rayside. In short, the emergence and success of new parties are hypothesized to be dependent on socio-economic transformations. However, this is not sufficient. Rather it opens up a political opportunity structure which in turn is constrained by formal (institutional) and informal (political) aspects. Hino's empirical research gives some support to the model. He concludes that some of the formal aspects, primarily the electoral system, are of importance for the success of new parties. However, when it comes to both the informal and the socio-economic aspects there seems to be no model which is valid for all three party groups. Hino's operationalization of new party success is the total vote share of all identified new parties in each election. That is, every party once considered as new, is so in each and every election which it competes in. Hence, Hino is explaining the variation in the share of votes placed on parties not originally members of the party system.

**Table 1:** Prior research on new party success

	<i>Hauss and Rayside (1978)</i>	<i>Harmel and Robertson (1985)</i>	<i>Hug (2001)</i>	<i>Hino (2006)</i>	<i>Bolin (2006)</i>
Data	23 cases	233 cases	260 cases	229 cases	187 cases
Dependent variable	The degree of formation success in a specific party space	The new party's maximum share of votes in any election it has competed in	The new party's share of votes in its first election	New parties total share of votes in each election	Number of new party entrants in each election
Unit of analysis	Party/pseudo party	New party	New party	Election	Election

A short summary of the discussed studies along with the corresponding information for this study is presented in table 1. Since the objective of this study is to explain when new parties enter for the first time, the dependent variable must in some way measure entrance and not vote share as Harmel and Robertson, Hug and Hino all have done in different ways. The easiest way of doing this is to identify when new parties enter the parliament. This makes it possible to get a variation on the dependent variable through differentiating between elections where no new parties enter and where one or many new parties enter. That is, the dependent variable in this study can be measured by either a dichotomous variable or by a count of the number of new entrances.



## Hypotheses

Although the focus of this study is not the same as the prior research reviewed above, they serve as a good point of departure to identify possible explanations. Hence, many of the hypotheses in this section are deducted from prior research on why new parties emerge and how their initial strength can be explained. First, institutions and their hypothesized impact will be elaborated. Second, the different societal and economical factors which might be of interest will be presented.

### Institutional settings

In different institutional approaches the term institution has been attached with different meanings (see for instance March and Olsen 1989; Hall and Taylor 1996; Peters 2005). I will not here get into a discussion on what might be considered as an institution, but rather test the impact of different entities *often* labelled as different institutions.

In short, there seem to be two different types of institutional factors of importance. First, and perhaps most obviously, there is rules regulating the translation of votes into seats – the electoral system. Second, there are rules which enable and constrain the actions taken by the political parties. I begin by elaborating on the electoral system and its hypothesized impact on new party entrance before I turn to the institutions that more actively impact the actions taken by the parties.

#### *Electoral system*

Intuitively, the chances of getting elected should correlate with the design of the electoral system. This is also supported by the review of prior research above.

As early as the middle of the 1950s, Duverger stated what have become known as Duverger's law. Here he asserts that the "simple-majority single-ballot system favours the two-party system" (1954:217) and the "simple-majority system with second ballot and proportional representation favour multi-partism" (1954:239). This law, primarily addressing the relationship between electoral system and party system, has caused a never-ending base of research of party systems in general.<sup>5</sup>

Due to the multi-partisan implication of proportional representation we should expect there to be more new party entrances in countries where this kind of electoral system is enacted. However, it is not always obvious which system is the most proportional and which is the most disproportional. First, it is not quite clear what we mean by proportionality (Gallagher 1991).

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<sup>5</sup> Already in the early 1990s, Katz (1992) estimated there were about 2500 works on the forms and effects of representation and electoral systems.

Second, as mentioned earlier, it is not only the electoral formula that determines the proportionality of an electoral system. Different scholars have emphasized different aspects of the electoral system as being central for the impact on proportionality (see amongst others Rae 1967; Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Gallagher 1991; Lijphart 1994; Lijphart 1999; Anckar 2002). Besides electoral formula, district magnitude is the factor which in the literature have been considered to be the most important. There is even some research on its impact on new party success (Willey 1998). But various other factors, such as the influence of presidential election on legislative election, malapportionment<sup>6</sup>, interparty electoral links<sup>7</sup> and assembly size, have also been acknowledged significance. The first of these additional factors, the executive-legislative relationship, has been tested in prior research. Hauss and Rayside (1978:37) argue that when “attention is focused on the single office of presidency, its zero-sum nature encourages the bipolarization of the party system and makes it hard for weak parties [...] to compete effectively”. Although their analysis not completely confirm their hypothesis, it still seems to be well grounded and therefore worth to test once more.

One way to evaluate the impact of proportionality on new party entrance would be to use different measures proposed in the literature.<sup>8</sup> However, since these measures are empirically based and to some extent dependent on whether new parties enter or not, this is not a perfect operationalization. Therefore, I argue that it is more appropriate to disaggregate electoral system into different testable variables, based on the different aspects which affect the proportionality. The factors of interest are the electoral formula, district magnitude, electoral threshold, assembly size and executive-legislative relationship.

However, the electoral systems have been more or less stable all over Western Europe since the 1960s (Bowler et al. 2003). It might therefore be counterintuitive to believe that changing party systems is a consequence of static electoral systems. Some aspects will anyway be tested in the analysis, primarily because of their central role in the literature on new parties.

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<sup>6</sup> Malapportionment signifies that the voting population and the numbers of parliamentarians these choose not are proportionally distributed. This is most easily illustrated with single-member districts. If these districts not are equally populated within the whole country, the chance of getting elected, all other things constant, is easier in a low populated district compared with a high populated district. It takes more votes to get elected in the latter.

<sup>7</sup> In some countries there is a possibility for parties to have separate lists but to formally link these lists. In the initial allocation of seats the combined number of votes on these lists is used.

<sup>8</sup> For instance Rae index (Rae 1967), Loosemore-Hanby index (Loosemore and Hanby 1971) or the least-square index (Gallagher 1991).

### *Other institutions*

The electoral system, discussed above, describes the procedure of the translation of votes into seats. But there are also other electoral laws<sup>9</sup> (Farrell 2001). While electoral systems are rather static over time, other rules, such as ballot access, access to media and subsidies to political parties, are more frequently changed. Bowler et al. (2001; 2003) show that these rules have been altered towards a more liberal environment for all parties, which also would imply an easier way to success for new parties. However, the established parties seem to have gained even more on these changes. Hence, the changes rather imply a worse situation for the new parties now than during the 1960s.

As mentioned above, Hug (2000; 2001) stresses the intimate link between a party's formation and its subsequent potential success. He argues that considerations made in advance of the electoral participation also are of interest to explain how strong a party will be in its first electoral appearance. These considerations are enabled or constrained by the rules of entry. There are at least two such rules restricting the access to the ballots. First, in some countries a monetary deposit is required to compete in an election. And second, in some countries candidates need a minimum numbers of signatures to be eligible to run for election (Hug 2001; Tavits 2006). The higher such entry costs are the fewer parties should be expected to compete for seats in parliament. Hence, we should expect fewer new party entrances in parliament.

Due to declining membership numbers in political parties all over Western Europe, other ways to finance expensive party activities have been employed. Parties need money at least for three different purposes: campaigning, to maintain a viable inter-election organization and to finance research and other resources for the representatives of the party (Fisher and Eisenstadt 2004:620). Nowadays the state, instead of the party members, serves as the most important financier. This has caused Katz and Mair (1995) to argue for the emergence of a new type of party; the cartel party. Regardless the correctness of the model, state funded subsidies to political parties is today a reality which almost is present in every West European country.

The mechanism which would imply that subsidies have impact on new party success is derived from the importance of resources for political parties in general. In order to attract enough popular votes money are of potential importance (Lucardie 2000:178-179). Since political activities, such as campaigning, require monetary resources, financial incomes are essential for the survival of political parties. In particular new parties can be expected to suffer from weak economic situation compared to established parties. This further implies the importance of state funding.

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<sup>9</sup> These should not be mixed up with the electoral laws of Duverger.

Since the systems of subsidies comes in many different designs, several scholars have acknowledged the problems of measuring their impact and making cross-national comparison (Katz and Mair 1992; Nassmacher and Nassmacher 2001; Bergman et al. 2003).<sup>10</sup> Some countries have employed systems where only represented parties are eligible to obtain subsidies while others also give non-parliamentarian parties the right to get public support. Furthermore, there are not only differences when it comes to eligibility. Also the allocation rules, that is, rules regarding the distribution of money once a party has made the eligibility threshold, are widely different across countries. If the public funding exclusively benefits the parliamentary parties, the non parliamentary parties are disadvantaged. But even when parties that not are represented are eligible for subsidies some parties will inevitably be left out of the distribution. Since the allocation of money in some way is based on previous election results, parties which did not compete in that last election, typically new parties, will be disadvantaged. Thus, the employment of the state subsidies is an advantageous feature for big parties over small parties. Moreover, it favours incumbents over new parties (Müller 1993:422). However, recent research have showed that the impact of state subsidies seems to be of marginal importance and instead of freezing new parties out, rather help new parties to gain representation (Pierre et al. 2000; Scarrow 2006). Actually, in some countries the public subsidies make up a larger proportion of the total income for small parties than it does for the major parties and hence, would be more important for newcomers (Nassmacher 2001).

Another important aspect may be whether there exist limitations for campaign spending. Although the effect of campaign spending not is unambiguous, there is some research confirming that the size of the campaign expenses have effect on the number of votes received (Maddens et al. 2006). Since it can be assumed that the established parties generally have better economic resources than the new parties, restrictions on campaign spending can be imposed to even out the differences. This might at least be perceived as an equalizing factor between the established and the non-established parties. Through the establishment of such a campaign spending cap, the economic inequality would partly be neutralized. Of course some parties, not previously represented, can have equal or better economic prerequisites than established parties. However, in general the latter are better off. Adherents of these restrictions, argue that this strengthen the power of ideas over the power of money (Bergman et al. 2003:143).

Although it can be argued that restrictions on campaign spending would work in favour for poor parties (typically new parties), such regulations would at the same time possibly limit the

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<sup>10</sup> This is further highlighted by the fact that all of the different data sets on public party financing which I have looked into, have differed substantially (Katz and Mair 1992; Austin and Tjernström 2003; Ström et al. 2003; Casas-Zamora 2005). This is probably caused by the inherent complexity of public party finance system.

exposure of the different political parties to the public. Perhaps the most important way to present the party and its opinions in public is the use of media. It is likely that the party or those parties who control the media have an advantage over parties who do not (Müller 1993:425). The rules differ across countries in a couple of ways. First, there are some countries that allocate free broadcasting time for political parties. As with public party subsidies, this also can be differentiated between parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties. Second, some countries enable for parties to purchase extra broadcasting time. This possibility of course favours wealthy parties, that is, not in general the new parties. Thus, such possibilities may obstruct newcomers in the party systems. As a consequence of the more internationalized broadcasting market, with cable and satellite channels, political parties can circumvent the restrictions and use media where the national legislation is ineffective (Bergman et al. 2003:142).

### **Societal and economical conditions**

The impact of societal and economical factors is not equally evaluated as institutional conditions in the area of new party entrance. With this in mind, the evaluation of these factors will be more exploratory than the analysis of the institutions in the sense that the causal mechanisms behind the tested hypotheses are not as developed.

Based on Lipset and Rokkan (1967), both Hauss and Rayside (1978) and Harmel and Robertson (1985) emphasize that parties primarily is formed to fill the representational needs of society. Deduced from this, we should expect more new party entrances where there are more diverse representational needs. Hence, countries that are largely populated could be expected to get more new parties in parliament. Following the same logic, countries with ethnic, religious and linguistic heterogeneity would be more favourable for new parties.

The relation between economic indicators and new party entrance is ambiguous in the literature. Hug (2001) shows that the economic growth rate has a negative correlation with the emergence of new parties. Hino (2006b:123) on the other hand hypothesizes that New Politics Parties “win more votes when the GDP per capita is higher”. Although they do not test the exact same variable – Hug tests the impact of change of GDP while Hino tests the actual GDP, the implications of their choices are contradictory. If, as Hug argues, an increase in GDP is disadvantageous for new parties, a higher level of GDP would imply few new parties. The latter contradicts Hino’s argument. Since new parties form when “something is wrong” (Hauss and Rayside 1978:36), it would be more trustworthy to believe in Hug’s argument.

A second economic indicator of interest is unemployment rate. The rationale underlying the importance of this indicator is that unemployment fosters discontent which in turn would lead

the electorate to demand something new. That is, the higher unemployment rate, the easier for new parties to enter the parliament.

In table 2 all the hypotheses are presented.

**Table 2:** Hypotheses

<i>Factors increasing the chances for new parties to enter national parliament</i>	
<i>Institutional factors</i>	
H1	Proportional electoral formula
H2	High district magnitude
H3	Low electoral threshold
H4	Large assembly size
H5	Parliamentarism
H6	Low monetary cost of registration
H7	Few number of signatures required
H8	Party financing for non-parliamentary parties
H9	Campaign spending caps
H10	Media access for non-parliamentary parties
<i>Societal factors</i>	
H11	Large population
H12	High ethnic fractionalization
H13	High linguistic fractionalization
H14	High religious fractionalization
<i>Economic factors</i>	
H15	Poor economic growth
H16	High unemployment rate

## **Cross national patterns of new parties**

In every comparative analysis it is of greatest importance to decide the population of study. To avoid comparing ‘apples and oranges’, some limitations have to be done. In order to avoid selection bias (Geddes 1990; King et al. 1994) it is important to not only study periods where new parties frequently have entered the national parliaments. Therefore the study covers the period of 1960-1999. To go back even further would bring difficulties to obtain good comparative data (Hino 2006b:14-16). The spatial scope also has to be defined. Here, the data cover West European countries. However, a few exclusions are made. Since Greece, Portugal and Spain all have a recent history of non-democratic regimes,<sup>11</sup> elections held in these countries

<sup>11</sup> These three countries all have a history of dictator rule and did not hold what could be considered as free and fair elections until the end of the 1970s.

during dictatorship must be excluded. Non-democratic elections are out of the scope for this study. In addition, the first couple of elections held during the consolidation of the democracy resulted in a massive increase of the number of parties in their parliaments. Many of these parties were parties which had been active before the authoritarian rule took place and hence not new *per se*. Excluding these elections therefore results in a more robust analysis. Hence, only elections held from 1980 and onwards in these countries are included. In all, the population comprises of 18 West European countries. Besides the first 15 EU-countries (EU-15), also Iceland, Norway and Switzerland are included. In total, 187 elections have been held in these countries during the studied period.

As can be seen in table 3 the number of new parties differs quite clearly between the West European countries. Excluding all electoral alliances as well as mergers (see discussion above), the average number of splits and genuinely new parties entering the national parliament in every election is 0.77. That is, less than one new party manages to get elected for parliament in every election. However, in some countries, most obviously Italy, there is almost two new parties entering the parliament every election. In sharp contrast, Austria has the most stable party system. Here only one new party, the Liberal Forum, has managed to get elected.<sup>12</sup>

**Table 3:** Number of new parties in national parliament, per country

<i>Country</i>	<i>Elections.</i>	<i>Splits and genuinely new</i>			<i>Genuinely new</i>		
		<i>Number</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Rank</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Rank</i>
Austria	12	1	0.08	18	0	0	18
Belgium	13	15	1.15	5	8	0.62	6
Denmark	16	8	0.5	15	4	0.25	15
Finland	11	9	0.82	10	7	0.64	5
France	10	6	0.6	13	3	0.3	14
Germany	11	2	0.18	17	2	0.18	17
Greece	7	6	0.86	7	3	0.43	13
Iceland	11	7	0.64	12	5	0.45	12
Ireland	12	10	0.83	9	7	0.58	8
Italy	10	18	1.8	1	12	1.2	1
Luxembourg	8	7	0.88	6	4	0.5	10
Netherlands	11	14	1.27	3	8	0.73	4
Norway	10	6	0.6	13	5	0.5	10
Portugal	7	6	0.86	7	4	0.57	9
Spain	5	7	1.4	2	6	1.2	1
Sweden	13	3	0.23	16	3	0.23	16
Switzerland	10	12	1.2	4	9	0.9	3
United Kingdom	10	7	0.7	11	6	0.6	7
Scandinavia	39	17	0.44		12	0.31	
Others	148	127	0.86		84	0.57	
Total	187	144	0.77		96	0.51	

<sup>12</sup> The Greens, first elected in 1986, is a merger of the Alternative List, United Greens of Austria Citizens Parliamentary Initiative and some different provincial groups (Mackie and Rose 1991) and therefore not counted as a new party.

Sources: For the calculations of these numbers the main source was Mackie and Rose (1991; 1997). Katz et al.(1993-1999), Bartolini and Mair (1990) and Parties and Election in Europe, have all been used to complement the main source.

If we turn to regional patterns we can clearly see that the Scandinavian countries all have quite few new parties in a comparative perspective. On average there is less than one new party in every second election in Scandinavia. In the other West European countries there is not that far from one new party every election. Although, Denmark during 1960-1999 has had eight new parties in the Folketing, on average they are among the low scorers. Excluding the splits and only compare the number of genuinely new parties, we can see that the patterns from the comparison with both splits and genuinely new parties, more or less are relevant here as well. Although Norway ranks somewhat higher, there is no doubt that Scandinavia is a low scorer when it comes to genuinely new parties as well.

If we instead turn to the temporal patterns presented in table 4, we can see that the tendency of increasing number of new successful parties which was apparent during the period 1960-1999 has during the last decade stagnated. If this is a temporary shift in the trend is still to be seen. Nonetheless, there are more new parties entering national parliaments now than during the first decade of study. The patterns for genuinely new parties are similar to those where also splits are included.

**Table 4:** Number of new parties in national parliament, per country

<i>Decade</i>	<i>Elections</i>	<i>Splits and genuinely new</i>		<i>Genuinely new</i>	
		<i>Number</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Mean</i>
1960	38	20	0.53	11	0.29
1970	48	34	0.71	17	0.35
1980	53	49	0.92	38	0.72
1990	48	41	0.85	30	0.63

Sources: See table 3.

## Analysis

Due to problems with lack of reliable and comparable data, all of the hypotheses posed above, can not be tested at this stage of the study. Hypotheses 2 and 3, regarding district magnitude and electoral threshold will not be tested. Furthermore, because of the complexity of rules regarding election participation such as monetary registration costs and signature requirements, neither hypotheses 6 and 7 will be tested.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup> There is systematic collected data on the issue (Katz and Mair 1992). So far, however, it has been hard to recode the data into comparable variables.



Table 5 provides descriptive statistics for the dependent variables along with the independent variables in the analysis. In the table there are four different dependent variables. The first one is a count of the number of splits and genuinely new parties that has entered in each election. The second is a dichotomized version of the first dependent variable. The third dependent variable is a count of the number of genuinely new parties that has entered in each election. The fourth and final dependent variable is the dichotomized version of number of genuinely new parties. There are two reasons for using four different dependent variables, one methodological and one theoretical. The methodological reason behind adding a dichotomized variable is the few instances of elections where more than one new party enters the parliament. Too few observations in a category of outcomes can yield insecure results. The second, theoretical reason has to do with the question asked. Explaining the number of new parties in an election and explaining under what circumstances new parties in general enter are two closely related but nonetheless different queries. In the rest of the paper, only the dichotomized dependent variables, that is, 1b and 1d, will be used.

Further information on the operationalization might be needed for some of the variables. The electoral formula is a value, ranging from 0 to 3, based on its proportionality according to Lijphart's categorization.<sup>14</sup>

Whether a presidential government is a constraining factor for new parties is tested by a dichotomous variable. Due to the lack of pure presidential systems in the countries under study, the opportunity to test this hypothesis is not optimal. Following Lijphart (1994:15) I therefore test if semi-presidential systems as well as parliamentary systems where the president is elected directly have the same impact.

Variables 5-9, regarding rules on party financing, campaign spending and public broadcasting are all dichotomous variables indicating whether it exists or not. As can be seen in table 5, there are only 177 observations of variables 5-9 (compared with 187 for most others). This is due to missing data for Switzerland on these variables.

There are three variables measuring the degree of fragmented society along three different dimensions: ethnic, linguistic and religious. High values indicate large fractionalization and 0 indicates no fractionalization.

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<sup>14</sup> Following Hino (2006b:105), who bases his classification on Lijphart (1994:159), the least proportional electoral formulas, the first-past-the-post and the majority-plurality formula is given the value 0. The d'Hondt and Imperiali formulas are given the value 1, modified Sainte-Laguë, LR-Droop and single transferable vote are given the value 2 and finally the most proportional electoral formulas, the LR-Hare and the pure Sainte-Laguë formulas are given the value 3.

**Table 5:** Descriptive statistics

	<i>Variable</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
1a	No. splits and genuinely new parties	187	0.77	1.05	0	6
1b	Splits and genuinely new parties, dichotomous	187	0.47	0.50	0	1
1c	No. genuinely new parties	187	0.51	0.82	0	5
1d	Genuinely new parties, dichotomous	187	0.36	0.48	0	1
2	Election formula	187	1.487	0.888	0	3
3	Parliament size	187	275.546	178.808	56	672
4	Parliamentary government	187	0.663	0.474	0	1
5	Public party financing	177	0.785	0.412	0	1
6	Public party financing, non-parliamentary parties	177	0.254	0.437	0	1
7	Legal cap on campaign spending	177	0.119	0.324	0	1
8	Public broadcasting time	177	0.808	0.395	0	1
9	Public broadcasting time, non-parliamentary parties	177	0.644	0.480	0	1
10	Population size (million)	187	19.289	23.629	0.186	82.191
11	Ethnic fractionalization	187	0.184	0.17	0.047	0.555
12	Language fractionalization	187	0.214	0.197	0.02	0.644
13	Religion fractionalization	187	0.34	0.199	0.091	0.722
14	Average annual economic growth	183	0.027	0.02	-0.025	0.082
15	Unemployment	181	5.219	4.132	0	18.579

Sources: Variable 1 and 3: see table 3. Variable 2: Lijphart (1994), Carter (2002), Grofman and Lijpart (2002) and Monroe and Rose (2002). Variable 4: Lijphart (1994). Variable 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 Strøm et al. (2003). Variables 10 and 14: Heston et al. (2006). Variables 11, 12 and 13: Alesina et al. (2003). Variable 15: OECD.(1997)

### Bivariate analysis

Because of quite few instances of other values than 0 and 1 on the two dependent multi-category variables, only the dichotomized dependent variables are used in the bivariate analysis.

I first test the independent categorical variables. The frequency tables with measures of correlation and significance levels can in detail be studied in the appendix. These variables, all on institutions, point quite clearly in one direction. The institutional impact is quite marginal. If we allowed us to set a permissive significant level as high as  $p < 0.10$ , in all, only two of the categorical institutional variables are significant or close to significant.<sup>15</sup> Public party financing for non-parliamentary parties is significant when both splits and genuinely new parties are taken into account. When only genuinely new parties are included the variable, although close to, is not significant. However, the relation is, contradictory to the hypothesis, negative. That is, the existence of party financing for non-parliamentary parties is a facilitating factor for new parties. The other significant variable is whether there exists legal cap on campaign spending. As hypothesized the existence of such cap makes it easier for new parties to enter national parliaments. Strictly this variable is only significant on the 0.10-level when only genuinely new parties are taken into account. However, the p-value is just slightly above significance ( $p = 0.101$ ) when also splits are included.

<sup>15</sup> Since there are quite few observations it is reasonable to set this significant level. This makes it possible also to discover weak relationship.

In only 19 of 187 elections a none proportional electoral formula has been used.<sup>16</sup> Therefore it is hard to tell whether the impact of this variable is reliable. This is further emphasized by the fact that there is a, contrary to the hypothesis, negative significant relationship between degree of proportionality and whether there are new entrants in an election. This counterintuitive result is caused by the operationalization of the level of proportionality each different electoral formula has been assigned. Indeed, Katz (1997:137) argues that the impact of the electoral formula on the proportionality is “nearly irrelevant” if only considering the proportional formulas. This is also supported by the fact that when the variable is dichotomized into majoritarian or proportional electoral formula, the coefficient turns positive and hence in the hypothesized direction. The relation is now however, not significant.

To examine the continuous independent variables, I compare the mean of each continuous variable. The result is presented in table 6. The t-tests of the continuous variables give weak support for the hypotheses. The last institutional variable, *Parliament size*, does not seem to matter at all. The economic indicators however partly support the hypotheses. The average unemployment rate during election years where no genuinely new parties entered the national parliament is 4.8. This can be compared with 5.9 per cent unemployment where there were new entrances. This is a significant difference. The same values when splits are included in the analysis points in the same direction, although it is not strictly significant ( $p=0.177$ ). The other economic indicator, *Average annual growth*, is not significant.

The t-tests for the societal indicators give no significant results. There are very small differences for the population variable. However, both ethnic and linguistic fractionalization are close to being significant if both splits and genuinely new parties are included. If splits are excluded, no such pattern can be obtained.

**Table 6:** Mean comparison of continuous independent variables

<i>Independent variable</i>	<i>Splits and genuinely new parties</i>			<i>Genuinely new parties</i>		
	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>P-value</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>P-value</i>
Parliament size	278	273	0.846	272	282	0.711
Average annual growth (%)	2.5	2.8	0.333	2.7	2.6	0.877
Unemployment (%)	4.8	5.7	0.177	4.8	5.9	0.083
Population (million)	20.2	18.3	0.590	19.5	18.9	0.861
Ethnic fractionalization	0.17	0.20	0.127	0.17	0.20	0.271
Linguistic fractionalization	0.19	0.24	0.103	0.21	0.23	0.441
Religious fractionalization	0.34	0.34	0.828	0.34	0.33	0.727

Note: The P-value denotes the significant level of the T-test.

<sup>16</sup> In UK, the first-past-the-post formula has been used during the whole period. In France the majority/plurality formula has been used during the whole period except the 1986 election.

## Multivariate analysis

The phenomenon under study, successful new parties, is in the analysis represented as the count of number of new parties in an election. However, since the outcomes for both *Number of splits and genuinely new parties* (80 per cent) and *Number of genuinely new parties* (89 per cent) are to a great extent either 0 or 1, dichotomized variables are used.

As the dependent variable is a measure of rare events, its mean is located close to zero and closely conforms to the Poisson distribution (Hoffmann 2004:102). The Poisson distribution presupposes two requirements. First, the events that make up the Poisson distribution (the dependent variable) have to be independent. That is, the probability of an event occurring is constant and independent of previous events (King 1998:50). Second, the variance of the dependent variable is assumed to be equal to its mean (Hoffmann 2004:104; Dunteman and Ho 2006:23). The variance of the dichotomized dependent variables slightly differs from their means (see table 5). However, the negative binomial model, an alternative model earlier used in research on new parties (Tavits 2006), does not seem to be a better model. Since the dispersion parameter, alpha, in the latter model not is significant, the Poisson estimation technique fits the data better.<sup>17</sup> The logit model, another alternative commonly used when the dependent variable is dichotomous has also been tested. However, the differences are only marginal.

In order to check for serial correlation, a first lag of the dependent variables is included as an explanatory variable. If events are dependent on previous events, we should expect the lagged dependent variable to be significant in the model.

In addition to potential serial correlation, it is highly likely that the observations are correlated within countries (cf. Beck 2006). If not controlling for such intra-cluster correlation, one runs the risk of underestimating the true variance (Williams 2000). Therefore, to obtain a robust variance estimate I control for within-cluster-correlation.<sup>18</sup>

In table 7 the results from the three Poisson regression models with the dependent variable, *Splits and genuinely new parties*, are presented. In the table, parameter coefficients, standard deviations and incidence rate ratios are presented.

In model 1 the institutional conditions are tested. Overall, the model shows poor result in predicting new party entrance. Only one of the variables, *Party financing for non-parliamentary parties*, is significant. However, it is not significant in the expected direction. The presence of subsidies for non parliamentary parties decreases the chance for new party entrance with approximately 30 per cent (IRR=0.695).

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<sup>17</sup> When the dispersion parameter, alpha, equals 0 the negative binomial model is equivalent with the Poisson model.

<sup>18</sup> The check for within-cluster-correlation is conducted with the use of the cluster () function in Stata.

Following the results from the bivariate analysis, the electoral formula is included in the model dichotomized. The variable is not significant in the model but is quite close ( $P=0.157$ ) and moreover, the relation with the dependent variable is in the expected direction.

The social conditions tested are even less helpful in explaining new party entrance. As can be seen in model 2, none of the independent variables of social conditions are significant. However, the lagged count of new parties is significant, indicating that there is serial correlation.

Finally, examining the results of model 3, we can see that neither the economic indicators explain when new parties enter national parliaments. As in model 2 though, the lagged count of new parties is significant here as well.

**Table 7:** Poisson regression of splits and genuinely new parties

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Model 1</i>		<i>Model 2</i>		<i>Model 3</i>	
	<i>Institutional conditions</i>	<i>IRR</i>	<i>Social conditions</i>	<i>IRR</i>	<i>Economic indicators</i>	<i>IRR</i>
Electoral formula, dichotomous	0.442 (0.31)					
Parliamentary size	0.000319 (0.00068)					
Parliamentary government	0.0374 (0.19)					
Public party financing	-0.128 (0.16)					
Public party financing, non parliamentary parties	-0.364* (0.21)	0.695				
Legal cap on campaign spending	0.196 (0.18)					
Public broadcasting time	-0.474 (0.52)					
Public broadcasting time, non parliamentary parties	0.401 (0.54)					
Population			0.000000322 (0.0000065)			
Ethnic fractionalization			0.0807 (1.00)			
Linguistic fractionalization			0.464 (0.90)			
Religious fractionalization			-0.214 (0.63)			
Average annual economic growth					4.957 (3.64)	
Unemployment rate					0.0219 (0.018)	
Dependent variable lag	0.200 (0.17)		0.333* (0.18)	1.395	0.322* (0.19)	1.380
Constant	-1.138*** (0.43)		-0.988*** (0.23)		-1.176*** (0.22)	
N	177		187		177	

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ , IRR = Incidence rate ratio

In table 8, the three different models with the second dependent variable, *Genuinely new parties*, are presented. The results follow the patterns of the first three models. There are however, some differences worth to mention. In model 4, two of the institutional variables are significant. Just as in model 1, *Public party financing for non parliamentary parties*, is significant. The incidence rate ratio

indicates that the impact on genuinely new party entrance is even greater than it is when splits also are included. The presence of the funding decreases the chances for genuinely new party entrance with approximately 40 per cent. Also the variable, *Legal cap on campaign spending*, is significant. Such cap increases the chances of genuinely new party entrance with as much as 50 per cent all other variables held constant.

When it comes to societal conditions, model 5 gives no support for the hypotheses. In addition, the lagged variable which was significant for splits and genuinely new parties, is now non significant.

Finally, we can see that in the last model, with the economic indicators, the *Unemployment rate* is significant. The incidence rate ratio tells us that each percentage increase of unemployment increases the chances for genuinely new party entrance with more than 4 per cent.

**Table 8:** Poisson regression of genuinely new parties

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Model 4</i>		<i>Model 5</i>		<i>Model 6</i>	
	<i>Institutional conditions</i>	<i>IRR</i>	<i>Social conditions</i>	<i>IRR</i>	<i>Economic indicators</i>	<i>IRR</i>
Electoral formula, dichotomous	0.613 (0.45)					
Parliamentary size	0.000862 (0.00071)					
Parliamentary government	0.0112 (0.22)					
Public party financing	0.0896 (0.23)					
Public party financing, non parliamentary parties	-0.504** (0.22)	0.604				
Legal cap on campaign spending	0.408* (0.24)	1.503				
Public broadcasting time	-1.241 (0.77)					
Public broadcasting time, non parliamentary parties	0.909 (0.79)					
Population			0.000000383 (0.0000086)			
Ethnic fractionalization			0.876 (1.20)			
Linguistic fractionalization			-0.309 (0.99)			
Religious fractionalization			-0.179 (0.89)			
Average annual economic growth					2.146 (5.27)	
Unemployment rate					0.0435* (0.023)	1.044
Dependent variable lag	0.289 (0.27)		0.251 (0.21)		0.314 (0.21)	
Constant	-1.633*** (0.58)		-1.159*** (0.27)		-1.446*** (0.31)	
N	177		187		177	

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1, IRR = Incidence rate ratio

The multivariate analysis of both of the dichotomous dependent variables gives little of support for the hypotheses. Nonetheless, some of the insights drawn are worth some reflection. First, among the institutional factors public party financing for non-parliamentary parties seem to have an effect on both splits and genuinely new party entrance. Since the effect is not in the expected direction, only qualified guesses can at this stage serve as guidance for why this is so. One way of interpreting it is that lot of the subsidies goes to former parliamentary parties. At the same time, only few of the new parties never represented has managed to reach the eligibility level where they receive funding. Hence, instead of helping new parties, party public funding for non-parliamentary parties instead open up the gap between them and the established parties.

A second institutional variable of at least some importance is whether there exist caps on campaign spending. This factor however, is only significant for genuinely new parties. This might be interpreted as if splits have better economic resources than genuinely new parties, and therefore is not benefited equally from the restrictions on campaign spending.

The earlier raised doubts concerning the actual impact of the electoral system got confirmation. The analysis give evidence to argue that the electoral system which have been stable in virtually all of the countries of the analysis (Italy is an exception) cannot explain the changing party systems.

The societal conditions seem to be of little importance while at least one of the economic indicators gives some further information on when new parties enter national parliaments. When the unemployment rate is high, genuinely new parties have better chances to get elected.

### **Scandinavian countries in the light of a West European context**

In the introductory parts of the analysis I showed that the three Scandinavian countries all are low-scorers when it comes to new party entrance. Now the question remains whether the inferences drawn from the West European context can contribute to the understanding of why this is so. Few of the hypotheses have been supported by the bivariate and multivariate analysis. However, there are some signs of variables being more important than others. From both the models of institutional conditions we have learned that the presence of public party financing for non-parliamentary parties decreases the chances of new party entrances. Hence this would imply that such subsidies should be present in the Scandinavian countries. Indeed there is. In Denmark it was introduced in 1986, in Norway 1975 and in Sweden 1972. On the other hand, many of

those new parties that have entered the parliaments in these countries have done so after the introduction of the public subsidies for non parliamentary parties.<sup>19</sup>

A second institution, at least partly important, is whether cap on campaign spending exists. Following the multivariate analysis presented in model 4 above, genuinely new parties would benefit from such caps. Since no such cap exists in any of the Scandinavian countries, we can at least conclude that as far as these countries concerned, the hypothesis seems to be valid.

Finally, the variable for unemployment was significant in model 6. This pattern is however not present in the Scandinavian countries. Actually, the mean unemployment rate is higher in elections where no new parties enter than it is in elections where there are new entrants.

Although the result from this brief survey of the Scandinavian countries not strictly conforms to the result from the analysis with the other West European countries included, one inference is reinforced. The system-level analysis does not seem to give us the deep understanding on when new parties enter national parliaments that we perhaps initially thought it would do.

## Conclusions

This paper had three objectives. The first one was to map the development of new parties in Western Europe during the period 1960-1999. The differences between countries are quite remarkable. In some countries such as Italy, almost two new parties on average enter the parliament each election. In other countries, most typically Austria, there are almost never any new entrants. The three Scandinavian countries all are relatively stable when it comes to number of new parties. In a comparative perspective they all are low-scorers positioned in the bottom third of West European countries. With small deviations, the same patterns hold for an analysis with only genuinely new parties included.

The temporal pattern shows that there are more new entrants during the latter part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Although it seems that the number of entrants somewhat stagnated during the 1990s, there is still higher rates than during both the 60s and 70s.

The second objective of the study was to examine the cross-national variation. Using three types of explanatory factors, institutional, societal and economic factors, I tried to explain when new parties enter national parliaments for the first time. Overall, the analysis of the three different groups of explanations, gave weak support for the hypotheses. There are at least three possible causes for this. First, some of the factors which are thought to impact new party entrance are not included due to missing data. In addition, there might of course also be other

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<sup>19</sup> In Denmark one split and one genuinely new party has entered the Folketing, in Norway three genuinely new parties have entered the Storting and in Sweden three genuinely new parties have entered the Riksdag since the public party financing for non-parliamentary parties has been introduced.



factors of importance not included. Related to this is the quality of the data actually used in the analysis. Particularly, data on public party financing is complex and therefore hard to use and interpret in an easy fashion in system-level analysis (Katz and Mair 1992; Nassmacher and Nassmacher 2001; Bergman et al. 2003). Nonetheless, most of the data is reliable and would therefore give better support for the hypotheses if they would really have impact.

The second possible cause, partly related to the first cause, is whether the models are correct specified. Because of the count characteristic of the dependent variables, a count model (Poisson regression model) was used to estimate the impact of the different factors. However, since both of the dependent variables was dichotomized before included in both the bivariate and multivariate analysis, it might have been better to use a logit (or probit) model. Such model is suited for binary outcomes. Nonetheless, such models have been tested as well. These estimations however, gave only small differences compared with the Poisson regression models.

The third and most important cause is the huge difficulties to explain new party entrance from the single use of system-level analysis. Although some insights can be done, as has been showed here, the use of case studies to deepen the knowledge of individual parties probably would be a good way to complement the system-level analysis.

The final objective of the study was to apply the insights from the cross-country study on the Scandinavian countries. The understanding of these countries however, did not get much greater and instead underlined the conclusion drawn from the system-level analysis that in-depth case studies probably is of importance to understand new party entrance.

## Appendix

### Bivariate statistics

Categorical variables, cell percentages

Dependent variable: Splits and genuinely new parties, dichotomous:

<i>Splits and genuinely new parties</i>	<i>Electoral formula (dichotomous)</i>		<i>Total</i>
	<i>Non proportional</i>	<i>Proportional</i>	
No	6.42	47.06	53.48
Yes	3.74	42.78	46.52
Total	10.16	89.84	100

Cramer's V = 0.065, P = 0.372

<i>Splits and genuinely new parties</i>	<i>Parliamentary government</i>		<i>Total</i>
	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	
No	18.72	34.76	53.48
Yes	14.97	31.55	46.52
Total	33.69	66.31	100.00

Cramer's V = 0.030, P = 0.684

<i>Splits and genuinely new parties</i>	<i>Public party financing</i>		<i>Total</i>
	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	
No	10.73	44.07	54.80
Yes	10.73	34.46	45.20
Total	21.47	78.53	100.00

Cramer's V = 0.050, P = 0.502

<i>Splits and genuinely new parties</i>	<i>Public party financing (non-parliamentary parties)</i>		<i>Total</i>
	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	
No	37.85	16.65	54.80
Yes	36.72	8.47	45.20
Total	74.58	25.42	100.00

Cramer's V = 0.139, P = 0.064

<i>Splits and genuinely new parties</i>	<i>Legal cap on campaign spending</i>		<i>Total</i>
	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	
No	50.28	4.52	54.80
Yes	37.85	7.34	45.20
Total	88.14	11.86	100.00

Cramer's V = 0.123, P = 0.101

<i>Splits and genuinely new parties</i>	<i>Public broadcasting</i>		<i>Total</i>
	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	
No	10.17	44.63	54.80
Yes	9.04	36.16	45.20
Total	19.21	80.79	100.00

Cramer's V = 0.018, P = 0.808

<i>Splits and genuinely new parties</i>	<i>Public broadcasting (non-parliamentary parties)</i>		<i>Total</i>
	<i>0</i>	<i>1</i>	
No	21.5	33.3	54.8
Yes	14.1	31.1	45.2
Total	35.6	64.4	100

Cramer's V = 0.082, P = 0.273

Dependent variable: Genuinely new parties, dichotomous:

<i>Genuinely new parties</i>	<i>Electoral formula (dichotomous)</i>		<i>Total</i>
	<i>Non proportional</i>	<i>Proportional</i>	
No	7.5	56.1	63.6
Yes	2.7	33.7	36.4
Total	10.2	89.8	100

Cramer's V = 0.070, P = 0.337

<i>Genuinely new parties</i>	<i>Parliamentary government</i>		<i>Total</i>
	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	
No	22.5	41.2	63.6
Yes	11.2	25.1	36.4
Total	33.7	66.3	100.00

Cramer's V = 0.045 P = 0.539

<i>Genuinely new parties</i>	<i>Public party financing</i>		<i>Total</i>
	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	
No	14.7	50.3	65.0
Yes	6.8	28.2	35.0
Total	21.5	78.5	100.00

Cramer's V = 0.038, P = 0.615

<i>Genuinely new parties</i>	<i>Public party financing (non-parliamentary parties)</i>		<i>Total</i>
	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	
No	46.3	18.6	65.0
Yes	28.2	6.8	35.0
Total	74.6	25.4	100.00

Cramer's V = 0.102, P = 0.173

<i>Genuinely new parties</i>	<i>Legal cap on campaign spending</i>		<i>Total</i>
	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	
No	59.3	5.6	65.0
Yes	28.8	6.2	35.0
Total	88.1	11.9	100.00

Cramer's V = 0.133, P = 0.076

<i>Genuinely new parties</i>	<i>Public broadcasting</i>		<i>Total</i>
	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	
No	10.7	54.2	65.0
Yes	8.5	26.6	35.0
Total	19.2	80.8	100.00

Cramer's V = 0.093, P = 0.216

<i>Genuinely new parties</i>	<i>Public broadcasting (non-parliamentary parties)</i>		<i>Total</i>
	<i>0</i>	<i>1</i>	
No	24.9	40.1	65.0
Yes	10.7	24.3	35.0
Total	35.6	64.4	100

Cramer's V = 0.076, P = 0.313

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