New Party Entrance - Analyzing the Impact of Political Institutions

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Abstract
Although research on new parties now is more common than just a couple of decades ago, we still lack a more general theory of when new parties manage to enter national parliaments for the first time. In this article I try to fill some of the gap in the literature by analyzing the impact of certain formal political institutions. Using a dataset made up of election results held in 18 West European countries between 1960 and 2005, some tentatively important political institutions are scrutinized. I find the electoral system is an important factor in the explanation of when new parties enter national parliaments. The impact of state subsidies to parties is, on the other hand, rather weak. This runs contrary to the cartel thesis, which implies that such subsidies serve to block the entrance of new parties. Overall, however, the institutional framework can provide only a partial explanation and can only be seen as one aspect of new party entrance. Socio-economic factors as well as actor-centred factors are other aspects with potential explanatory power.

Key words
Western Europe, new parties, electoral systems, campaign and finance law

Biography
Niklas Bolin is a PhD Candidate at the Department of Political Science at Umeå University, Sweden. The topic of his Ph.D. thesis is new parties and parliamentary representation. His most recent publication is ‘Towards a Two-Party System? The Swedish Parliamentary Election of September 2006’ in West European Politics (co-authored with Nicholas Aylott).

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INTRODUCTION

Although studies of new political parties are slowly increasing in number, we still lack a comprehensive understanding of when new parties manage to enter the most important political assembly, namely, the national parliament. Since few new parties emerged during the first 70 years of the 20th century, research in the area did not top political scientists’ agenda. According to the frozen party system theory of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), the 1960s party systems reflected the cleavage structures of the beginning of the 20th century, with the result that the party systems of the 1960s were virtually the same as those of the 1920s.1 During the last couple of decades, however, new parties have more frequently entered national parliaments. Accordingly, scholarly interest has also risen. Due especially to contributions from Hauss and Rayside (1978), Harmel and Robertson (1985), Hug (2001) and Hino (2006), we now have some understanding of new party success.

Nevertheless, these studies, and most others as well, focus on either new party formation or electoral success. Although a new party must attain some electoral success to enter parliament, entrance and electoral success is not equivalent. In this article the objective is to explain under what circumstances new parties enter national parliaments for the first time. Bearing in mind that the explanation for new party entrance is doubtless a complex issue, in this study I exclusively evaluate the impact of formal political institutions. Socioeconomic conditions as well as important explanations based on the interactions between the new party and the established parties are not within the scope of this paper. To put it differently, the underlying question of the article is one that has been posed over and over in different fields of the social sciences (e.g. Weaver and Rockman 1993; Norris 2003): Do institutions matter?

Since the entrance of new parties into parliament is a question related to that of formation and electoral success, I will in this article make use of explanatory factors tested in prior studies of these latter issues. From these studies, two types of hypotheses concerning political institutions are derived. The first concerns electoral institutions such as the electoral formula, district magnitude, electoral thresholds, as well as parliament size and the executive-legislative relationship. The second set of hypotheses concerns institutions constraining or facilitating actions taken by parties. These include rules concerning party subsidies, public broadcasting and campaign spending.

This article begins with a review of previous research in the field of new parties, and then takes up the theories underlying the identified hypotheses. Since the meaning of the concept ‘new party’ is sometimes ambiguous, I then define how it is used in this study. Finally, the hypotheses are tested on a dataset of the results of all elections held in 18 West European countries during the period of 1960-2005.

1 Others have, however, argued that the party systems never were frozen. See, for instance, Shamir (1984). Sundberg (1999), on the other hand, argues that the core of the Scandinavian party system still is frozen according to the Lipset and Rokkan hypothesis.
PRIOR RESEARCH

Prior research about new parties can be divided broadly into two related, but separate, areas: namely, research on when and why new parties form and research on the electoral success of new parties. The bulk of the literature primarily focuses on the formation, but some also deal with electoral performance. Rare or even absent is a third potential area of research which focuses on the entrance phase of new parties. Not only are these research areas theoretically differentiated, they are also differentiated technically. The dependent variable utilized in the various studies differs; consequently, the questions themselves, and their subsequent answers, differ.

Hauss and Rayside (1978) conducted one of the first studies where new parties were systematically analyzed. Their primary interest was to explain why new parties are born. In their study the authors interchangeably use the terms emergence, formation and development of new parties. Their dependent variable, however, could best be described as measuring whether a party has attained success or not. In their analysis, 23 cases are studied, which involved either cases of new parties being formed or cases where no new party was formed in any of three different party groups. For instance, in the group of ethnic/linguistic parties that they studied were cases of ‘some of the most successful […] new parties’ as well as cases of ‘the failures of American blacks and French Bretons to form their own parties’ (Hauss and Rayside 1978: 33). Even though their dependent variable is, to some extent, rather arbitrary, their study is interesting.

Hauss and Rayside analyze three different types of explanations: institutional factors, the importance of deepening cleavages and strains in society and the impact of actions taken by the established parties (political facilitators). The first two (institutional facilitating factors and deepening cleavages and strains) are not per se sufficient explanations, according to Hauss and Rayside, but they are not judged unimportant. A weakness in the Hauss/Rayside study of institutions, however, lies in their operationalisation. The variables tested are quite broad and this becomes evident in their analysis of the impact of the electoral system. Deducted from Duverger’s law (1954), Hauss and Rayside hypothesize that a proportional electoral system would be beneficial for new parties. What exactly they mean by a proportional system, however, is not obvious. As research has shown (see below), the electoral formula it is not the only factor that determines the proportionality of an electoral system.

Although Hauss and Rayside was one of the first systematic expositions of new parties, it was explorative rather than explanatory in character. In contrast, Harmel and Robertson (1985) in their analysis of 233 cases conducted a study that builds on an accumulation of explanatory factors tested by other scholars. Using factors, they focus on two questions: namely, what conditions explain new party formation and what conditions explain new party success? The dependent variable for the analysis of successful new parties is the new party’s maximum share of the total votes in any of the elections in which it has participated. Essentially, this is an analysis of the factors that contribute to a new party maximizing its percentage of votes.

Harmel and Robertson identify and test three sets of different explanatory factors: social factors, political factors and structural factors. Social factors, derived from the understanding that new parties fill representational needs in society (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), are tested through data on country population, pluralism, heterogeneity and sectionalism. The analysis
shows that these factors are important for the formation of new parties but not for the subsequent electoral success. The number of parties and the number of cleavage dimensions currently addressed in the party systems, which they label political factors, do show significance. However, contrary to what Harmel and Robertson hypothesized, new parties are more common in systems with many parties and where cleavage dimensions have already been addressed. The only factor showing significance for new party success in the expected way is one of the structural factors, namely, the electoral system. Similarly to Hauss and Rayside’s study, Harmel and Roberson find that proportional electoral systems are more beneficial for new parties than majority or plurality electoral systems. But, as in Hauss and Rayside, this study does not distinguish between different aspects of an electoral system.

In common with the majority of studies on new parties, Simon Hug (2000; 2001) concentrates on explaining the formation of new parties. Nevertheless, he also produces some findings of interest for the understanding of new party success. Perhaps the most important contribution is a methodological note. Hug stresses the intimate link between a party’s formation and its subsequent potential success. He argues that considerations made in advance of the electoral participation are useful in explaining the entrance of new parties in parliament. Rules that facilitate or constrain new parties from participation in the election can have impact on whether the new party competes at all. Examples of such rules are monetary costs of registering a party and the number of signatures necessary to form a party (Tavits 2006) but also rules regulating public subsidies to parties. Empirically, Hug (2001) tests a game-theoretic model for the prediction of a new party’s initial success. The dependent variable is the first electoral result for each new party. Hug explains, therefore, how strong a party will be in its first appearance at the ballots. Subsequent success (typically entrance into parliament) is not included in his study. Even though he includes both established parties and the new party in his model, Hug argues also for the importance of a third actor, voters, to be taken into account. Partially as a consequence of not including voters in the model, he contends that only limited insights can be reached. Significantly, the Hug study tells us little about which factors are important to consider if we want to understand specifically why new parties enter national parliaments, rather than how strong they become in its first electoral appearance.

Finally, Hino (2006) has also contributed to the accumulated knowledge on new party success. Hino analyzes three groups of new parties: extreme right parties, ‘new politics’ parties and ethno-regionalist parties in Western Europe 1950-2004. He tests a model that builds on the Hauss and Rayside study. In brief, the emergence and success of new parties are hypothesized to be dependent on socio-economic transformations. Such transformations are not in themselves sufficient. Rather they open up a political opportunity structure which in turn is constrained by formal (institutional) and informal (political) aspects. Hino’s empirical research gives some support for the model. He concludes that some of the formal aspects, primarily the electoral system, are of importance for the success of new parties. However, when it comes to taking into account both the informal and the socio-economic aspects, there seems to be no model that is valid for all three party groups. Hino operationalises new party success as the total vote share of all identified new parties in each election. That is, every party once considered as new remains so in each and every election in which it competes. In essence, Hino is explaining the variation in the share of votes gained by all but the original members of the party system.

A simple portrait of previous studies, accompanied by the corresponding information for this study, is presented in Table 1. Since the objective of this study is to explain when new parties
enter for the first time, the dependent variable must measure entrance and not – as Hauss and Rayside, Harmel and Robertson, Hug and Hino have all done, albeit in different ways - vote share. The easiest way of doing this is to identify when new parties enter the parliament. This makes it possible to have variation on the dependent variable by differentiating between elections where no new parties enter and elections in which one or many new parties enter. In other words, the dependent variable in this study can be measured either by a dichotomous variable or by the number of new entrants. In the descriptive part of the analysis, the number of new entrants will be used in order to map the development of new parties in the national parliaments spatially as well as temporally. In the subsequent multivariate analysis the dichotomous dependent variable will be used.

Table 1: Comparative aspects of research on new parties

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td>23 cases</td>
<td>233 cases</td>
<td>260 cases</td>
<td>229 cases</td>
<td>213 cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>The degree of formation</td>
<td>The new party’s maximum</td>
<td>The new</td>
<td>New parties’ entry in election (dichotomous)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>success in a specific</td>
<td>share of votes in any</td>
<td>party’s</td>
<td>total share of votes in each election</td>
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<td></td>
<td>party space</td>
<td>election it has competed in</td>
<td>share of</td>
<td>votes in each</td>
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<td>New party</td>
<td>votes in</td>
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<td>its first</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>election</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unit of analysis</td>
<td>Party/pseudo</td>
<td>New party</td>
<td>Election</td>
<td>Election</td>
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Although the rise of new institutionalism (for instance, see March and Olsen 1989; Hall and Taylor 1996; Peters 2005) has broadened the definition of an institution, in this study I use a more narrow interpretation and thus follow the scholarly tradition of investigating the impact of formal political institutions (for instance, see Lijphart 1999; Lane and Ersson 2000).

Concisely, there seem to be two different types of political institutional factors of importance. First, and perhaps most obviously, there are rules regulating the translation of votes into seats, i.e., the electoral system. Second, there are rules that enable or constrain the actions taken by the political parties prior to election. I begin by elaborating on the electoral system and its hypothesized impact on new party entrance before I turn to the institutions that more actively enable or constrain the actions taken by the parties.

Electoral institutions

As early as the middle of the 1950s, Duverger stated what has become known as Duverger’s law. This asserts that the ‘simple-majority single-ballot system favours the two-party system’ (1954: 217) and the ‘simple-majority system with second ballot and proportional representation favour multi-partism’ (1954: 239). This law, addressing the relationship
between electoral system and party system, has resulted in a never-ending base of research of party systems in general.\(^2\)

Thus we should expect more new party entrances in countries with proportional electoral systems. However, it is not always obvious which systems are more or less proportional; nor is it clear what we mean by proportionality (Gallagher 1991). Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, it is not only the electoral formula that determines the proportionality of an electoral system (see, amongst others, Rae 1967; Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Gallagher 1991; Lijphart 1994; Lijphart 1999; Anckar 2002). Besides electoral formula, another factor that has been considered in the literature to be very important is district magnitude.\(^3\) But various other factors, such as the influence of presidential elections on legislative elections, malapportionment,\(^4\) interparty electoral links\(^5\) and parliament size, have also been acknowledged as being significant. The first of these additional factors, the executive-legislative relationship, has been tested in prior research. Hauss and Rayside (1978: 37) argue that when ‘attention is focused on the single office of presidency, its zero-sum nature encourages the bipolarization of the party system and makes it hard for weak parties […] to compete effectively.’ Although their analysis does not completely confirm their hypothesis, it still seems to be well grounded and therefore worth testing once more.

One way to evaluate the impact of proportionality on new party entrance would be to use different measures of disproportionality as proposed in the literature.\(^6\) However, given that these measures are empirically based and to some extent dependent on whether new parties enter or not, this is not an optimal operationalisation. Therefore, I find it more appropriate to disaggregate electoral systems into different testable variables, based on the different aspects that affect proportionality. In this study the impact of electoral formula, district magnitude, electoral threshold, parliament size and executive-legislative relationship will be evaluated.

Thus, we might expect a cumulative effect of generous electoral institutions and consequently more new parties where the rules of entrance are more liberal.

**Constraining/enabling institutions**

The electoral system, discussed above, describes the procedure by which votes are translated into seats. But there are also other election procedures and laws (Farrell 2001). While electoral systems remain rather static over time, other regulations, such as ballot access, access to media and subsidies to political parties, are given to more frequent change. Bowler et al. (2001; 2003) show that such rules have shifted towards a more liberal environment for all parties, which also would imply an easier path to success for new parties. However, the established parties seem to have gained more through these changes and, consequently, the changes occasion a worse situation for the new parties now than during the 1960s.

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\(^2\) By the early 1990s, Katz (1992) estimated there were about 2500 works on the forms and effects of representation and electoral systems.

\(^3\) The impact of district magnitude on new party success has been tested, for instance, by Willey (1998) who showed that the stability of a party system is dependent on the mean district magnitude.

\(^4\) Malapportionment means that the voting population and the number of elected parliamentarians are not proportionally distributed. This is most easily illustrated with single-member districts. If these districts are not equally populated throughout the country, the chance of getting elected, all other things constant, is easier in a low-populated district compared to a high-populated district. It takes more votes to be elected in the latter.

\(^5\) In some countries there is a possibility for parties to have separate lists but to formally link these lists. In the initial allocation of seats the combined number of votes on these lists is used.

\(^6\) For instance, Rae index (Rae 1967), Loosemore-Hanby index (Loosemore and Hanby 1971) or the least-square index (Gallagher 1991).
Due to declining party memberships in political parties throughout Western Europe, mechanisms other than membership dues have been employed to finance expensive party activities. One such device, the provision of state subsidies, may affect the entrance of new parties into the political system. It is generally recognized that adequate financial resources are vital for a political party (Lucardie 2000: 178-9). Both new and old parties need money for at least three different purposes: to campaign, to maintain a viable inter-election organization and to finance research and other resources for the representatives of the party (Fisher and Eisenstadt 2004: 620). Without sufficient monetary resources to carry out these activities, political parties cannot survive. Nowadays the state, rather than the party members, serves as the most important financier for party activity in almost every West European country.

Since the systems of subsidies come in many different designs, several scholars have acknowledged the problems of measuring their impact and making cross-national comparisons (Katz and Mair 1992; Nassmacher and Nassmacher 2001; Bergman et al. 2003). Some countries have employed systems where only parties represented in parliament are eligible to obtain subsidies, while others also give non-parliamentary parties the right to receive public support. This is not the only difference when it comes to eligibility. Allocation rules, that is, rules regarding the distribution of money once a party has made the eligibility threshold, also differ widely across countries. If public funding exclusively benefits the parliamentary parties, the non-parliamentary parties are disadvantaged. Even in systems where parties that are not represented are eligible for subsidies, some parties will inevitably be left out of the distribution. Since the allocation of money is in some way based on previous election results, parties that did not compete in the last election – typically, new parties – will be disadvantaged. Thus, the introduction of state subsidies is a feature more advantageous for major parties than for small parties. Moreover, it favours incumbents over new parties (Müller 1993: 422). However, the fact that public subsidies in some countries make up a larger proportion of the total income for small parties than it does for the major parties would indicate that subsidies are more important for newcomers (Nassmacher 2001). On the other hand, recent empirical research indicates that their impact appears to be of little importance (Pierre et al. 2000; Scarrow 2006).

Another important aspect may be whether limitations on campaign spending exist. Although the effect of campaign spending is not unambiguous, there is some research confirming that the size of the campaign expenses effect the number of votes received (Maddens et al. 2006). Since it can be assumed that the established parties generally have better economic resources than the new parties, restrictions on campaign spending can be imposed to even out the differences. This might at least be perceived as an equalizing factor between the established and the non-established parties. Through the establishment of such campaign-spending caps, the economic inequality would partly be neutralized. Of course, some parties that were previously not represented can have equal or better economic resources than established parties, but in general the latter are better off. Some argue that these restrictions strengthen the power of ideas over the power of money (Bergman et al. 2003: 143).

Although it can be argued that restrictions on campaign spending would work in favour of poor parties (typically new parties), such regulations would at the same time possibly limit the exposure of the different political parties to the voters. Perhaps the most important way to

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7 This is further highlighted by the fact that the various databases relating to public party financing differ substantially (Katz and Mair 1992; Austin and Tjernström 2003; Strøm et al. 2003; Casas-Zamora 2005). This is probably caused by the inherent complexity of public party finance system.
present the party and its opinions in public is the use of the media. It is likely that the party or parties who control the media have an advantage over parties who do not (Müller 1993: 425). The rules differ across countries in a couple of ways. First, some countries allocate free broadcasting time for political parties. As with public party subsidies, this can also be differentiated between parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties. Second, in some countries it is possible to purchase extra broadcasting time. Clearly, this possibility usually favours wealthy parties over new parties and may hinder newcomers to the party systems. A further factor emerges as a consequence of the more internationalized broadcasting market, as with cable and satellite channels allow political parties to circumvent the media restrictions in those cases where the national legislation does not effectively prohibit this (Bergman et al. 2003: 142).

**What is a new party?**

Before we go any further, it is crucial to define the subject under study. Since there is no unified definition of a new party, the following review, therefore, underpins the way the term is used throughout this study.

Harmel (1985: 405) identifies three different ways to look upon new parties. First, a party formed to challenge certain new issues can be considered a new party. These parties express new cleavage dimensions in the party system. A second way of defining a new party is in relation to a particular historical event. Parties can be divided into old parties, founded before this particular event, and new parties, founded after that event. Finally, new parties can be defined as those added to the original party system of a country. This last definition, of course, requires a definition of which parties can be considered members of the original party system. Granted that these three conceptions of new parties are neither complete nor unambiguous definitions, they all have in common the reference to new parties in the sense of newly formed parties.

Both Mair (1999: 210) and Erlingsson (2005: 52) use a definition similar to Harmel’s third interpretation of new party: a new party is defined as a party that was not originally a member of the once-consolidated party system. In addition, the two scholars also distinguish between different types of new parties. In general, new parties emerge in three different ways. First, parties can emerge as a consequence of a merger of two or more established parties. Second, parties might form as a consequence of a split. Sometimes such a split results in the death of the original party, but it is just as possible that the original party lives on, side by side with the new party. Third, there are new parties that are genuinely new. This implies that they formed as a consequence of neither a fusion nor a split (Mair 1999: 216). In addition to these three categories, Erlingsson also includes electoral alliances as another kind of new party.

Electoral alliances and mergers differ in a significant way from split parties and genuinely new parties. While the latter contribute additional contestants in the electoral race, alliances and mergers can be seen as being simply reorganized established parties, in other words, old contestants in a new shape. The emergence of the genuinely new parties and the split parties results in an expanded party system, which can be seen as a reaction to the actions taken (or

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8 Indeed, there is not even a unified definition of a political party. However, the often quoted definition of Sartori (1976: 64) serves this purpose for this article: ‘A party is any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office’.

9 Mair (1990) has in an earlier article used the terms fissions and fusions to denote splits and mergers respectively.
not taken) by the established parties (Hug 2001). Alliances and mergers, on the other hand, are in fact established parties which have reorganized in order to survive. Hence, the products of electoral alliances and mergers have a clearly easier path than split parties and genuinely new parties in getting elected for the first time (cf. Erlingsson 2005: 52). Given this, I will in this study only focus on split parties and genuinely new parties.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Patterns of new parties across space and time

One of the most important steps in every comparative analysis is selecting the population to be studied. To avoid comparing ‘apples and oranges’, certain limitations have to be imposed. In order to preclude selection bias (Geddes 1990; King et al. 1994) it is important not only to study periods where new parties frequently have entered the national parliaments but also periods where new entrants have been rare. Therefore, in order to include both those dimensions in our population catchments, the study covers the period of 1960-2005. To go back even further would present serious difficulties in obtaining good comparative data (Hino 2006: 14-6).

It is necessary also to delineate the study’s spatial scope. For this study the data cover West European countries, with several notable exclusions. Non-democratic elections are beyond the scope for this study. Accordingly, certain elections in Greece, Portugal and Spain that were conducted during non-democratic governance (during dictatorships) were excluded. In addition, the first couple of elections in new democracies have resulted in a massive increase in the number of parties in their parliaments. Many of these parties had been active before authoritarian rule, and thus were not new parties per se. By excluding these elections we have a more robust analysis. Hence, only elections held from 1980 and onwards in these countries are included. In all, the population consists of 18 West European countries, which comprise the first 15 EU-countries (EU-15) plus Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. In total, 213 elections have been held in those countries during the period under study.

Clearly, as depicted in Table 2, the number of new parties varies among West European countries. The average number of new parties entering the national parliament in each election is 0.75. In other words, overall less than one new party per election manages to enter parliament. However, in some countries, notably Italy, almost two new parties enter the parliament per election. In sharp contrast, Austria and Germany have the most stable party systems. In each of those two countries only two new parties have managed to be elected during the years 1960-2005.

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10 These three countries all have a history of dictatorial rule and did not hold what could be considered as free and fair elections until the end of the 1970s.
Table 2: Number of new parties in national parliament, per country 1960-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Elections</th>
<th>New parties</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>213</strong></td>
<td><strong>159</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.75</strong></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: For the calculations of these figures the main source was Mackie and Rose (1991; 1997). Katz et al. (1993-2006), Bartolini and Mair (1990), Psephos Adam Carr’s Election Archive (2006) and Parties and Election in Europe (2006), have all been used to complement the main source.

There is a discernible north-south division in that there are few new parties in northern countries like Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Germany yet many new parties in southern countries, especially Italy and Spain. The average number of new parties entering parliament after each election in the northern countries is 0.59 compared with 0.95 for the southern countries. The difference in mean is significant at the 95 percent level and confirms a north-south differentiation.\(^\text{11}\)

Turning to the temporal patterns presented in Figure 1, we can see that there was an increase in the number of new party entrances from about one new party every second election in the early 1960s to more than one new party every election in the early 1990s. Except for the five-year period 1975-9, the increase was steady. However, from 1995 and onwards a sharp decline has occurred. In the last half of the 1990s the new party entrance returned virtually to the same rate as in the 1960s. After the year 2000 there are even fewer new parties entering national parliaments. The empirical data presented here gives rise to speculation that the political market, to some extent, is becoming saturated. Perhaps we are facing a second wave of frozen party systems? Whether this is a temporary shift in the trend remains to be seen.

\(^\text{11}\) Due to the lack of a general accepted definition of northern and southern Europe, a mean comparison test was conducted with a division of the countries into the nine most northern and nine most southern countries. The nine most northern countries are Iceland, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Ireland, United Kingdom, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands.
Data and measures

Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the dependent variable along with the independent variables in the analysis. Because of the relative dominance of elections characterised by either no party or just one new party entering parliament, the dependent variable is transformed into a dichotomous variable.\(^{12}\) The dependent variable thus indicates whether any new party has entered the parliament following the election.

For some of the variables, more information on their operationalisation might be needed. The electoral formula is a dichotomous variable. The value 0 represents a non-proportional formula (first-past-the-post or two-round system) while the value 1 is given to proportional formulas (the d’Hondt, Imperiali, modified Saint Lagüe, LR-Droop, single transferable vote, LR-Hare and Saint Lagüe formulas). Although the different electoral formulas within each of the categories *per se* can have impact on the overall proportionality, the main division is along the lines of non-proportional versus proportional systems. Indeed, Katz (1997: 137) argues that the impact of the electoral formula on the proportionality is ‘nearly irrelevant’ if only the proportional formulas are considered.

Another electoral system variable is the district magnitude. This variable represents the average number of seats distributed in each electoral district. The electoral threshold variable denotes the share of votes at the national level needed to be eligible for seat distribution. The parliament size variable is simply measured by the number of seats in the parliament.

\(^{12}\) In 79.8 percent of the elections there were either no or just one new party elected for parliament.
A low district magnitude has nearly the same effect as a high electoral threshold. District magnitude and electoral threshold are ‘two sides of the same coin’ (Lijphart 1994: 12). Therefore, these two variables are sometimes merged into one variable, the effective threshold variable. Different ways to calculate the effective threshold have been proposed (see Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Lijphart 1994; Taagepera 1998; Taagepera 2002), but in recent years it seems like consensus has emerged over the following equation (1):

\[ T = \frac{75}{M} + 1 \]  

where \( T \) is the effective threshold and \( M \) the mean district magnitude. This equation, however, only takes into account the average district magnitude on constituency level. Taagepera (2002) has convincingly shown that size of the parliament and the number of districts are also important if we want to reach a measure based on nation-wide representation. Thus the following equation has been suggested (2):

\[ T = \frac{75}{(M + 1)} \times \sqrt{E} = \frac{75}{(M + 1)}\sqrt{S/M} \]  

where \( E \) is the number of electoral districts and \( S \) is the total assembly size. In order to test whether the electoral system is of importance for new party entrance I use both the second equation and the individual electoral system variables separately.

The final electoral variable, executive-legislative relationship, is used to test whether a presidential government is a constraining factor for new parties. Due to the lack of pure presidential systems in the countries under study, the opportunity to test this hypothesis is not optimal. Following Lijphart’s approach (1994: 15) I therefore test if semi-presidential systems, as well as parliamentary systems where the president is elected directly, have the same impact. The variable is therefore a dichotomy, where 0 indicates presidential (and semi-presidential) systems and 1 indicates parliamentary systems.

The enabling/constraining institutions are measured by dichotomous variables. The three variables are given the value 1 if there exist legal caps on campaign spending, public broadcasting time for parliamentary parties and public subsidies for parliamentary parties respectively. Many researches have recognized the problems that arise from comparative studies based on data on party finance rules; these problems hold for campaign spending and media access as well. The fundamental problem is the wide range of designs and rules employed in different countries, which makes it hard to compare one type of design with another. Consequently, we must be aware of the simplifications made when the variables are assigned dichotomous values.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>New parties, dichotomous</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>0.446</td>
<td>0.498</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Electoral formula</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>0.883</td>
<td>0.322</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Parliament size</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>278.737</td>
<td>180.457</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Parliamentary government</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>0.671</td>
<td>0.471</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>District magnitude</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>16.990</td>
<td>34.391</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Electoral threshold</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>0.879</td>
<td>1.616</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Effective threshold</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>2.124</td>
<td>1.144</td>
<td>0.632</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Legal cap on campaign spending</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.363</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Public broadcasting time</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>0.765</td>
<td>0.425</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Public party subsidies</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>0.770</td>
<td>0.422</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Multivariate analysis

As the dependent variable is a binary outcome variable, the requirements for OLS regression are not met. Consequently, logistic regression is used.

In order to check for autocorrelation, a first lag of the dependent variable is included as an explanatory variable. If events are dependent on previous events, we should expect the lagged dependent variable to be significant in the model (cf. Tavits 2006). In addition to potential autocorrelation, it is highly likely that the observations are correlated within countries. If one does not control for such correlation, there is the risk of misestimating the true variance (Williams 2000). Thus, I use Huber-White robust standard errors to control for within-cluster-correlation. Finally, five decade dummy variables are also included in the models to control for temporal dependence (Beck et al. 1998).

Table 4 presents the results of the logistic regressions where the electoral system variables are tested. Due to high correlations between electoral formula and district magnitude and effective threshold, the electoral formula variable is excluded. The Wald statistics are high and significant at the 99 percent level in all three models. The results offer support for the argument that the design of the electoral system is important for new party entrance. In Model 1, where the electoral system variables are tested individually, we can see that all the variables correlate with entry of new parties in the expected direction. In addition, three out of four predictors are significant. The only variable that is not significant is parliamentary government. However, we must keep in mind the conceptual stretching that was imposed on the variable due to the lack of pure presidential systems in Western Europe. What we can say is that there is no significant evidence that new parties have a better chance in a parliamentary system that does not have a popularly elected president than they do in a semi-presidential system or in a parliamentary system that does have a popularly elected president.

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13 District magnitude and electoral formula are almost by definition highly correlated. Every majoritarian electoral formula has an average district magnitude of 1 whereas proportional systems have district magnitudes larger than 1. Since the effective threshold is calculated from, among other variables, the district magnitude, the high correlation here is not that surprising either.
The parliament size is a highly significant predictor, but the odds ratio implies a rather weak impact. Since a one unit change of the assembly size seldom happens, it is more fruitful to investigate a more typical change. Even if the number of seats in a parliament increases by as much as 50 seats, the expected chance of a new party entering only increases by 10 percent. The district magnitude is also significant. But since it is a log transformation, the odds ratio is hard to interpret. Since it is not a linear relationship the impact of district magnitude differs, depending on the size of the district magnitude. The odds ratio indicates that an increase of one unit for the logged district magnitude variable increases the chance for a new party to enter by approximately 37 percent. Finally, the electoral threshold is also significant at the 99 percent level. The odds ratio implies a rather strong impact for this variable. A one unit increase of the electoral threshold decreases the chance for a new party to enter by almost 25 percent. The lagged dependent variable is insignificant, indicating there to be no autocorrelation.

In the second electoral institution model, the parliamentary government variable is not found to be significant. Effective threshold is, however, highly significant. This offers additional support for the first group of institutions to be of importance. Since the effective threshold is a measure that is a merger of various different variables, it is hard to interpret the odds ratio. Altogether, the electoral system seems to be an important factor for understanding new party entrance. However, the values for pseudo $R^2$ are rather unimpressive, which suggests that there are other factors to be considered before we can get the full picture of new party entrance.

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14 The Netherlands only has one electoral district, that is, the average district magnitude is 150. All the other countries in the study have more than one district and the average district magnitude ranges from 1 to about 20. To overcome the outlier problem of the Netherlands, I use a log transformation of the variable (Miles and Shevlin 2001).

15 For instance, an increase from log 0 to log 1 for the logged district magnitude increases the chance with 37 percent for new party entrance. This is equivalent to an increase in absolute district magnitude from 1 to 2.7. An increase from 2.7 (log 1) to 7.4 (log 2) gives also an expected increase in the chance of a new party entrance of 37 percent.
Table 4: Logistic regression, electoral institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B(SE)</td>
<td>Odds</td>
<td>B(SE)</td>
<td>Odds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament size</td>
<td>0.00187**</td>
<td>1.002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00059)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary government</td>
<td>0.249</td>
<td>0.245</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District magnitude (logged)</td>
<td>0.316*</td>
<td>1.371</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral threshold</td>
<td>-0.280**</td>
<td>0.756</td>
<td>-0.349**</td>
<td>0.705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective threshold</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable lag</td>
<td>0.259</td>
<td>0.331</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.439**</td>
<td>0.0138</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.55)</td>
<td>(0.53)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald</td>
<td>120.22**</td>
<td>40.84**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The cell entries are coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, and odds ratios for the significant predictors. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, 4 temporal dummy variables in specification not shown, 1 temporal dummy variable dropped due to multicollinearity.

In Table 5 the second group of institutional factors is modelled. In Model 3 only the enabling/constraining institutions are included, while Models 4 and 5 also include the variables from Models 1 and 2. In all three models the Wald statistics are high and significant.

The variables are all related with the dependent variable in the expected direction. The first predictor, a legal cap on campaign spending, is significant at the 99 percent level. Furthermore, the odds ratio implies that such a restriction is a very effective way of facilitating new party entrance. Nevertheless, since such caps only have been used in 33 out of 213 elections in the dataset, the impact should not be exaggerated at this stage. Although we need further research on the impact and effects of campaign spending, it is an interesting result. Interestingly, the presence of free broadcasting time for parliamentary parties does not seem to be an important factor. Although the presence of public subsidies for parliamentary parties is nearly significant in the model (the predictor is significant at the 90 percent level), the findings further support earlier studies on the marginal effects of public party subsidies. There is no autocorrelation since the lagged dependent variable is not significant.

In Model 4 and 5 the two groups of institutions are merged. The findings from these models are nearly identical with those obtained from the analysis made with the groups separated. There are no significant differences in the coefficients and standard errors. The same predictors are significant in the merged models, although some of them not at the same level. Due to the greater number of predictors included in these models, the values for pseudo R² are somewhat higher than in the first three models. However, they are still rather low, which further implies that there are factors left out of the analysis that are of importance.
Table 5: Logistic regression, enabling/constraining institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B(SE) Odds</td>
<td>B(SE) Odds</td>
<td>B(SE) Odds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal cap on campaign spending</td>
<td>0.952** (0.36)</td>
<td>1.048* (0.44)</td>
<td>0.905* (0.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public broadcasting</td>
<td>-0.315 (0.37)</td>
<td>-0.328 (0.29)</td>
<td>-0.361 (0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public party subsidies</td>
<td>-0.750 (0.40)</td>
<td>-0.717 (0.38)</td>
<td>-0.610 (0.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament size</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00151* (0.00074)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary government</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.283 (0.28)</td>
<td>0.317 (0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District magnitude (logged)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.382** (0.12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral threshold</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.212** (0.079)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective threshold</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.302* (0.12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable lag</td>
<td>0.400 (0.28)</td>
<td>0.142 (0.32)</td>
<td>0.243 (0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.900 (0.66)</td>
<td>-2.106** (0.72)</td>
<td>-0.537 (0.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.084 (0.12)</td>
<td>0.118 (0.103)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald</td>
<td>30.03** (213)</td>
<td>171.06** (213)</td>
<td>57.32** (213)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The cell entries are coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, and odds ratios for the significant predictors. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 4 temporal dummy variables in specification not shown, 1 temporal dummy variable dropped due to multicollinearity.

CONCLUSIONS

Although political parties in general have lost some of their importance (Dalton and Wattenberg 2002; Webb et al. 2002), arguably they are still the main actors of national politics. An important part of party politics is, of course, modifications in party systems and new entrants on the parliamentary scene. Until fairly recently, the study of new parties was a significantly understudied area of social science, but over the last decade this has changed. Nevertheless, Luther and Müller-Rommel (2002: 7) argue that ‘[…] political science has not yet produced a ‘party theory’ […] which would be able to predict party failure and/or success’.

In this article the question of when new parties enter national parliaments has been addressed. Focusing on explanatory factors, political institutions have been evaluated. The dataset used for the analysis covers 18 West European countries during the period 1960-2005. The descriptive analysis showed that there is both a spatial and a temporal variation in new party entrances. When it comes to spatial variation there is a significant north-south division with more new entrants in southern Europe than in the northern part. When it comes to temporal patterns, there have been two contradictory trends. Up to the mid-1990s an increasing number
of new parties entered the national parliaments. Yet, during the last decade there has been a rather sharp decline in new entrants. There were actually fewer new parties entering the national parliaments in the last period of the study (since the year 2000) than there were during the first period under study (1960-64).

Two groups of political institutions and their impact on new party entrance were investigated: The first group represents the electoral system. Several different factors such as, district magnitude, electoral threshold, parliament size and the relation between the executive and the legislative arena were tested. The rationale underlying the hypothesized impact of these factors is grounded in Duverger’s law. Since majoritarian electoral systems promote a two-party system, or at least a few-party system, the chances for new party entrances in such systems would be worse compared to countries where proportional representation is used. Hence, a proportional electoral system would be a favourable condition for new parties striving for national representation.

The second group of political institutions concerns factors that constrain or enable the actions taken by the parties in general and the new parties in particular. The particular factors tested in this study are the impact of public party subsidies, caps on campaign spending and eligibility to public broadcasting.

The results of the multivariate analysis show that new party entrance is associated with the first group of institutions representing the electoral system. In the same way that others have argued about related issues (Harmel and Robertson 1985; Willey 1998; Hino 2006), this study argues that the electoral system is an important factor for understanding of new parties. Both the analysis of the individual variables and the use of the merged measure of effective threshold indicate that the design of the electoral system has an independent effect on new parties’ chances of being elected for the first time.

The second group of political institutions is a little harder to evaluate. Indeed, it is certainly true that data on public party financing is complex and therefore hard to use and interpret in system-level analysis (Katz and Mair 1992; Nassmacher and Nassmacher 2001; Bergman et al. 2003). Analysis of the data suggests that a legal cap on campaign spending is favourable for new parties. This finding, however, has to be treated with some caution. Due to the paucity of cases where such campaign spending caps exist, the results are preliminary and need further research to be fully confirmed. Findings of the study lead to the conclusion that the impact of public party subsidies seems to be of little importance. Accordingly, contrary to what the cartel party thesis suggests (see Katz and Mair 1995), the introduction of such subsidies is a poor guardpost against new parties.

In all, the formal institutional framework in which parties emerge and function does have an impact on new parties. At the same time, it is just as certain that this framework cannot fully explain when new parties get elected into national parliaments. As was pointed out early in the article, institutions are just one of various factors which play an important role in explaining new party entrance. To see the full picture, socio-economic factors as well as actor-centred explanations should also be reviewed.
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