Socialist Communication Strategies and the Spring of 1917

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The Russian Revolution of 1917 presented Swedish Social Democrats with a dilemma: how could they use the transnational revolutionary momentum to further universal suffrage, without supporting actions possibly leading to violence? In striking this balance, the use of communications was central. This article uses the concept of the media system to analyse the communicative practices and strategies developed by the Party in the early 20th century, and how these were employed between 1915 and 1917, in relation to the hunger marches and revolutionary pressures. The study shows that the Party had established conscious agitation strategies and an elaborate national communication structure, which enabled coordinated opinion activities. As early as 1915, the Party began using these tools to initiate a national opinion movement concerning the food situation. In 1917, faced with the combination of events in Russia and erupting hunger marches, the Party leadership chose to emphasize security and stability, focusing on events the Party could control, such as the 1 May demonstrations. The resulting development of revolutionary opinion in Sweden during the spring of 1917 and the ensuing political changes reflected conscious media management strategies by the Left, who used the media system to navigate and shape a transnational revolutionary moment.

**Keywords** media history, transnational revolution, history of political communication, sweden, social democracy
communication in times of crisis, or in the unique situation when revolution comes knocking at the door?

This was an open question in the spring of 1917, when national and international developments presented socialist parties in all the Nordic countries with both opportunities and challenges. Rising food prices and political instability fuelled discontent among parts of the population, but the outcome in each country depended on many different factors. One such factor was how the involved actors handled communication. In a revolutionary moment like the one in 1917, opinion activities can both increase revolutionary sentiment through aggressive rhetoric and decrease revolutionary pressures by emphasizing calm and orderliness.

Whereas both political party communications and the history of revolutions are vast research fields, they have rarely been combined. The purpose of the current article is thus to contribute to this intersection by analysing how Swedish Social Democrats handled their political communication between 1915 and the spring of 1917, with a particular focus on their strategy towards the hunger demonstrations. The analysis uses the theoretical concept of the media system and will provide new insights into how the transnational revolutionary forces interacted with political party communications.

In the early months of 1917, a series of events turned up the political heat in the region, which makes the situation well suited to capture this interaction. When the prices for bread, grains, and meat rose dramatically in Sweden during the First World War, low-wage groups suffered, while farmers, merchants, and speculators made significant profits. The situation was already tense when the transnational revolutionary developments arrived as a proverbial match to light the fire. Swedish newspapers covered the Revolution in Russia, where shortage of food was an important factor, in great detail. Moderate and radical socialists in Sweden disagreed over how to react to this development and a rift developed in the Social Democratic Party. In April 1917, the deterioration of the food situation led to a wave of manifestations around Sweden. Demonstrators petitioned for larger rations and improved food supply. According to some accounts, 146 such food demonstrations erupted in more than 100 different places around the country from mid-April onwards. Up to 300,000 people were reportedly engaged in these activities. As a result of this movement, different groups of socialists intensified their agitation for political reform, and demanded that, finally, Sweden should get universal suffrage for men and women.

Researchers have debated on how close Sweden was to experiencing a revolution in 1917. Carl-Göran Andræ has stated that the balance between reform and revolution nearly tipped over, and that the country was dangerously close to choosing the route of violence. Francis Sejersted has questioned this interpretation, and argues that established structures for dialogue and negotiating interests in Sweden alleviated revolutionary pressures. Sejersted does not question, however, that there were serious revolutionary sentiments in Sweden between 1917 and 1918, due to a combination of the food situation and international events.

One thing is clear, and that is that the revolutionary pressure constituted a dilemma for Swedish Social Democrats. How could the threat of the revolution coming to Sweden be exploited, without encouraging actions potentially leading to
violence? At a meeting of the party Board in May 1917, the conflicting goals were described in this way:

What the people want is bread, and that shall not be accomplished through any strikes. If the country would be driven into revolution, to the contrary endless looting would increase the despair. On the other hand, of course we must not let the lead of this movement slip from our hands, but must be prepared to meet situations which may arise.\(^5\)

The challenges were not unique to Swedish Social Democrats. Nils Elvander has emphasized that there were many similarities between Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, and that the food situation was even worse in Norway, which made the working class there even more receptive to revolutionary agitation.\(^6\) Although Risto Alapuro has described Finland as a hybrid case, situated in between the Scandinavian countries and eastern Europe, it also represents an important parallel to the development in Sweden, in terms of the combination of internal structure regarding class and economics, and external factors.\(^7\) Swedish Social Democrats were in frequent contact with their counterparts in Norway, Denmark, and Finland, and invited representatives from Social Democratic parties in these countries to their congress in 1917.\(^8\)

Internationally, socialist communications have been investigated as a part of national mass media history,\(^9\) but few studies exist which examine the events of 1917 from a strategic communication perspective. A rare exception is the 1967 essay The Significance of Communications in 1917 by Roger Pethybridge. He outlines how the early Russian revolutionaries used communication technologies to overcome social and geographic fragmentation. In his analysis, the sense of community in Russia did not change just because power structures were remodelled. Therefore, a systematic use of communication techniques such as the telegraph and newspapers was necessary in order to incorporate a larger share of the population in the revolutionary sentiment.\(^10\)

On the national level, significant attention has been paid to the workers’ movement in Sweden and the role of the events of 1917 in the democratization process.\(^11\) Investigations of the hunger demonstrations specifically, such as the recent Potatisrevolutionen by Håkan Blomqvist, as well as other studies, have reconstructed the course of events and emphasize the spontaneous character of the manifestations.\(^12\)

Whereas the historiography of the revolutionary events in 1917–1918 is broad-ranging, we still lack knowledge of the communicative practices of Swedish socialist parties at this point in time. A few studies have analysed socialist communications from adjacent perspectives. A language-oriented volume, edited by Olle Josephson, looked into the oratory and rhetoric of Swedish socialists of the era, focusing primarily on oral agitation strategies and rhetorical patterns.\(^13\) Using the Swedish major strike in 1909 as their case, Pelle Snickars and Mats Jönsson have provided important insight into how socialist parties in Sweden used the media in the early 20th century.\(^14\) Literary scholars have also touched on the topic,\(^15\) whilst the history of socialist party newspapers in Sweden has been studied from political and economic perspectives.\(^16\)

To conclude, although some related themes have been investigated, the communicative practices of socialist parties, in particular in revolutionary times, remains an
understudied field. Through an analysis of how Swedish Social Democrats handled their political communication between 1915 and the spring of 1917, the current article seeks to fill this gap by answering the following three research questions.

1. How did the Social Democratic Party use combinations of different media forms available in the media system to forward their agenda in the period 1915–1917?
2. Which communicative structures and practices did the Swedish Social Democratic Party have in place as the transnational revolutionary events and national hunger demonstrations of 1917 unfolded?
3. How did the response by the Social Democratic Party to the hunger manifestations and transnational revolutionary events relate to the existing communicative strategies and practices of the party?

The study employs a qualitative text analysis of several kinds of sources to map the development of social democratic communication decisions and activities, tracing the reasoning behind decisions taken and the presentation of the communication outcomes. Of particular value is the combination of internal documents from the Social Democratic Party, such as the printed congress proceedings, as well as original archival sources and socialist—as well as other—newspapers from the period. This combination of sources makes it possible to examine the interplay between internal practices and strategic decision-making, and the outcomes in the form of manifestations directed at public opinion, as well as public coverage.

**Theoretical framework: the concept of the media system**

The article proposes to analyse the communication structures and responses of the Swedish Social Democrats using the concept of the media system. This concept puts a focus on the communicative aspects of political actions, and relates them to the messages, strategies, and range of media forms employed by actors to promote their interests in a given time and societal context. In previous historical research, a media system has been broadly defined as the sum of medial forms and technologies in a certain time, the relations between these forms, and the actors making use of these medial expressions. In a study of the media history of the Norwegian South Pole conquest in 1911, Espen Ytreberg has proposed a similar concept, namely media ensemble. His study uses the concept to analyse how ‘collaboration between media platforms, genres and forms’ contributed to making the South Pole conquest into a media event, in the sense of Dayan and Katz. The key difference between media ensemble and the concept of media system is that the latter situates different media forms and representations in a larger societal context, including factors such as technical, institutional, and legal aspects related to communication. The concept of historical media systems as it is applied in the current paper also bears resemblance to the macro-level media system concept established by Hallin and Mancini, in that it focuses not only on media forms but also on the larger societal structure in which these forms exist and are appropriated by different actors. Rather than just describing an interrelated set of media expressions, the analysis seeks to clarify the role different media forms play in carrying out the intentions of historical actors within the boundaries set by the societal context.
A contentious question has been whether centralized governance of these communicative dimensions regarding structure and intention is required for one to speak of a ‘system’. The power of particular central actors or institutions in setting boundaries and controlling media flows has been illustrated by Örjan Simonsson in a study of the how the development of early postal services interacted with the needs of the central state administration. The issue of central control has several layers, in which activities by institutions or actors at the national government level, for example concerning legal, economic, or political aspects of communication, should be seen as one level. The centralization of communication efforts instituted by the Social Democratic Party would then represent a coherent communication structure on a lower level within the larger media system. The current article elaborates on whether the communicative system put in place by the Social Democratic Party should be seen as a media system in itself.

A related question concerns the media dimension of transnational events. The revolution in Russia in March 1917, which was covered in detail by Swedish newspapers, could also be seen as a transnational media event. Coverage by foreign media contributed to the ripple effect of the events in St Petersburg and elsewhere. Along this line of interpretation, the outbreak of food riots in Sweden constituted a reflection of the transnational connections between the media and people. The central actors in the Social Democratic Party were deeply involved with the developments in Russia on a personal level, both travelling to visit and inviting revolutionaries to Sweden. Such endeavours not only created a concrete transnational context in which the hunger demonstrations were viewed, but also served to amplify the connections between different national media and their audiences. Media interest was high both when Swedish socialist leaders visited Russia and when Lenin himself came to Sweden. Social Democratic newspapers also printed letters sent from Russian revolutionaries.

The communicative challenge for the Social Democrats was to make the most of the possibilities brought by the international crisis, employing the structures and strategies the Party had established in the first decades of the 20th century, while at the same time avoiding contributing to increased hardships and chaos in the country by provoking demands for a fully-fledged revolution. This was made ever more challenging by the internal rift that developed in the Party, as the Party was split, and divisions turned former colleagues into bitter opponents.

The ideology and practice of social democratic communications in Sweden

Socialist communication was part of an ideological framework, in which the goal of changing society for the better could be achieved through a combination of internal organization and outward agitation. A major ideological inspiration for Swedish Social Democrats was Ferdinand Lassalle, who saw the workers’ movement as being in a state of permanent campaign. Although the Party was a revolutionary one, however, this strive to spread the message of socialism should not be confused with ‘agitation by dynamite’, as an early party congress made clear. The constituting congress of the Swedish Social Democratic Party had emphasized the role of agitation, but the dominating forces in the Party were heavily influenced by German theories, in particular Kautskýism. This meant a moderation of direct revolutionary ambitions.
and that focus was directed towards achieving universal suffrage. Extra parliamentary actions such as agitation were a means towards this end.  

A brief overview shows that Social Democrats developed a number of strategies and employed a variety of media forms in their agitation efforts. Oral agitation was central, and special agitators were appointed to travel around the country and distribute texts and party newspapers, as well as organize workers’ unions around the country. A focus of this agitation in the years around 1900 was to increase membership and to institute new worker communes. The archives of the workers’ movement contain numerous accounts of the systematic agitation tours made by special agitators, who became celebrities in their own time. Newspapers were also central. August Palm, one of the founders of the party, said: ‘in order to be heard and spread out, the movement needed newspapers’. From 1885, Social-Demokraten, which was published in Stockholm, became the official organ, and its Editor, Hjalmar Branting, stated it was a necessity to be in possession of this ‘powerful means’ for shaping opinion. As Kjell Östberg has pointed out, in around 1910, editors and journalists constituted a large part of the people employed by the Party and should be seen as party officers. This added to the central role of communications in the Party activities. As a means to strengthen direct communication between the Party’s central deciding mechanisms and the grass roots level, heads of the local party organizations were obliged to, at each meeting, repeat all calls to action published in the official Party organ, and to encourage subscriptions. 

An important sign of increasing control over communications was the institution of a central ‘Committee for agitation’ in 1894, which placed the communicative activities of the Party under the control of the Action Committee of SAP [Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetarparti/ Swedish Social Democratic Party]. Henceforth, published agitation brochures more closely mirrored the central ideology of the Party. Efforts were also made to increase the ‘systematic orderliness’ [planmässighet] of communication efforts by setting up annual agitation plans, decided by the Party board, and to divide the country in newspaper districts, to ensure that each part of the nation had access to a local socialist newspaper. Economic struggles and lack of advertising revenue prevented realizing the full scale of this vision. This indicates that the national media system set boundaries on the scope and reach of the Social Democratic media repertoire.

Publishing brochures and pamphlets was also important, and sometimes the circulation of such texts could be substantial. One reason for using brochures was to promote socialism in remote areas less frequented by travelling oral agitators. Printing manifestoes and pamphlets with statements regarding current issues of pressing concern were seen as tools that could, in some cases, create a ‘massive storm of opinion’. During some opinion campaigns, more than 250,000 copies of such manifestoes would be disseminated around the country. Sometimes, when conservatives or parties on the Right had organized particular opinion activities, Social Democrats would carry out a counter-agitation, using a combination of media forms and activities. For example, public demonstrations and meetings could be organized in conjunction with a targeted distribution of printed texts of different sorts. The demands made in those demonstrations and texts were then repeated during meetings between the prime minister and groups of members from the Party.
The 1 May demonstrations, strikes, and a news agency

The annual 1 May demonstrations were a particular socialist communication activity. At those times, centrally penned manifestoes, with blank lines where local branches could fill in their location and number of people gathered, were distributed. By adding their own information to the joint statement, the local meeting could express their support for central political demands decided by the Party’s acting committee. Subsequently, by collecting those local statements, the Party would speak with a unified voice. The Party also published special political election brochures and calls to action. In some election campaigns, the Party estimated it had distributed over 2 million copies of brochures and leaflets. Other communication media produced during election time included drawings and caricatures to be used by the Party press, in which the Party finances shouldered the cost for printing clichés. In 1914, the Party press had a circulation of almost 200,000. In addition, papers with a ‘socialist spirit’, including union papers, had a circulation of 143,000.

To provide this group of socialist papers with material, in 1915 a proprietary news agency, Presscentralen, was instituted by the socialist collaborative forum Samorganisationen and approved by the Party board. This press agency could be used in many ways, which went beyond sending out news telegrams. At a meeting of the Party board in 1916, Per-Albin Hansson suggested that Presscentralen should prepare a proposition on how to conduct and finance a ‘press field campaign’ against the Right-wing papers and war activists. This shows that this news agency could also be used as a strategic resource to impact opinion. Yet another form of communication employed to highlight political demands was mass petitioning. Organizing such petitions required a major effort, and one such ‘people’s petition’ gathered around 360,000 names in support of universal suffrage. An even more serious communication tool to put pressure on decision makers was strikes. The Swedish Social Democrats, in line with the decision made at the International Socialist Meeting, distinguished between a ‘general strike’, which would encompass a total cessation of work and be a revolutionary action, and a ‘major strike’, which would pressure, but have less adverse effects on society. In 1909, a ‘major strike’ had been carried out in the country, and quickly turned into a media phenomenon, when papers filled up with articles, pictures, and notices about the consequences of the cessation of work.

This overview shows that, when faced with the challenges of the revolutionary events of 1917, the Swedish Social Democrats could rely on an established set of communicative practices and structures, which included set strategies and a broad range of media forms and activities, to spread centrally decided messages and exercise political pressure. The media forms thus included public demonstrations and marching in the streets, 1 May demonstrations, other mass meetings, strikes, petitions with signatures, pamphlets and information brochures, newspaper articles and opinion pieces, drawings and caricatures, among others. Other media forms used to promote socialist messages were visual posters, speeches in the parliament (reprinted in minutes and referred to in newspapers), songs, newsreels (through journal films), and flags and banners. This variation and breadth of coverage and expression, in which essentially the same messages, decided by the party board based on party ideology and current circumstances, circulated across platforms, no doubt reinforced the opinion effect of the activities. The broad range of forms also made possible strategic decisions about
which forms to use and when, based on cost considerations, organizational effort required, and other concerns.

One major issue in light of the disruptive nature of revolutionary activities developing internationally in 1917 was legality and the relation to the police. The tension between socialist communication activities and the legal boundaries is an example of the structural constraints of the national media system. The communicative activities of the socialists had a history of clashing with the interests of those in power and laws restricting public communication in Sweden had been passed in 1889 and 1906. Legal historians debate whether the actual purpose of these laws was to limit socialist agitation but conclude that the laws gave greater leeway to the authorities if they wanted to do so. Based on the Swedish laws, police officers parsed advertisements for socialist meetings, read newspaper reports from gatherings, and visited a large number of public events. Between 1885 and 1921, almost 2,000 meetings were put under police surveillance and, in 1910–1918, on average 60 meetings with socialist leanings were investigated each year.

One should note that the Right-wing parties in power, such as Allmänna valmansförbundet, were also active in the public sphere and strived to present Right-wing papers with material such as pamphlets and current political texts. However, these were considered less of a threat to society. Rather, activities such as the nationalist ‘citizen feast’, designed to compete directly with the socialist 1 May activities, had the direct support of the king.

**Early attention to the food situation**

What should people do when there simply is no food to buy? Food shortages have been known to ignite radicalization and incite protests ever since the early modern period. Many studies have addressed the specific problems with food supply during the First World War. Logistical issues, speculation, and public discontent all contributed to the problems of the food market. Manifestations against food shortages due to the war became commonplace in many regions of Europe. The war situation had damaged food supply systems not only in the Nordic countries but also in Britain and elsewhere. In the United States, food prices also led to general protests. The Swedish food situation gained interest across the world; even in New Zealand, papers noted that there was a ‘Food Shortage in Sweden’.

The economic development created a widening rift between those making money from food speculation and those hit by shortages. During the war, the Swedish economy expanded, which led to rising prices in many sectors. The Stockholm Stock Exchange rose significantly and reached a peak in 1917. It therefore seemed that some groups of people were doing very well financially during the war. When combined with scarcity of supply, many types of goods became subject to price speculation. The Swedish attitude towards Britain led to a disturbance of British imports to the county and worsened the situation. The contrast between the profits of the speculators and the problems of the lower classes most affected by rising food prices and scarcity provided a timely real-world illustration of Marxist ideology. Beginning in the autumn of 1916, authorities in Sweden resorted to measures such as rationing and enforcing price freezes.
The contrast between corporate profits and a suffering general population fit very well with pre-existing notions in the socialist movement of a class struggle, and was interpreted as a consequence of the flaws within the capitalist system. It became a common perception in Sweden that the times in which one lived were a ‘dyrtid’, a distinct expression meaning a time characterized by the high cost of living. The system of food rationing and the news coverage of business speculation in food prices further fuelled anger over the unjust commercial system.55

Protests against food shortages and the price situation not only concerned the conditions for supply and pricing of individual goods, but also extended into a critique of the entire system. Some of the criticism was also directed at the farmers who wanted the highest possible pay for their produce. Thus, when the food situation became urgent, unsurprisingly, groups in society turned to existing communication and power resources to make their voices heard. For the Social Democrats, this meant activating a long-standing repertoire of media expressions.

By 1915, the food prices and the ‘high cost of living’ in general had become an important issue for Social Democrats. In the report of the Party board for 1915, a significant part of the activities during the year concerned ‘the struggle against the high cost of living’ and the efforts to ‘influence local and national political authorities to take action’. The Party board had sent out a circular in May 1915, responding to requests from members. From many parts of the country, demands had been raised that the party board should ‘on a particular day organize protest meetings against the high cost of living’.56 This suggested action was similar to the later erupting hunger protests of 1917, in that it proposed multiple manifestations across the country, but different from the later hunger protests in that it presumed a synchronized campaign with a central message. These early requests from Party members were at first declined, partly because of cost concerns, and partly because the recent 1 May demonstrations had also addressed the same issue. The scope of the 1 May manifestations made it unlikely that ‘major opinion meetings’ on the same theme could be organized soon after. Instead, the Party board proposed that local workers’ communes could send representatives to a meeting that the Stockholm workers’ commune had set up to present demands to the government. Such a meeting was later held on 1 June and 50 representatives from Stockholm and around the country presented a list of demands to the prime minister and the Minister of Agriculture. In connection with this meeting, a separate proclamation was prepared, which was directed at the general public. Here, by choosing to allocate communication resources in a more economic way, calls for a public manifestation were channelled into a private meeting with government representatives. The results of the meeting were subsequently widely publicized by the socialist press.

The party board convened at several times in 1915 to discuss the food situation and the high cost of living, and, after first turning down member suggestions for manifestations, subsequently decided two important things. Firstly, that the executive committee of the party, together with union representatives, should ‘take the lead in organizing opinion concerning the expensive times’, and also take care of the cost for such activities. Secondly, to express the wish that ‘demonstrations against the expensive times be arranged all over the country’.57 The annual report later mentioned that in several places such locally organized meetings had actually been held, for example in Karlskrona, Karlshamn, Ronneby, and Sölvesborg, among many others. In Blekinge
alone, 10 meetings protesting against the high cost of living had been held in 1915. \(^{58}\) It is hard to tell exactly why the Party board warmed to the idea of public demonstrations in 1915. One reason could be that the demands from members had reached a tipping point. Another possibility is that the board had found a way to enlist additional help from local forces, in order to distribute the workload.

Once the decision to go forward with public activities had been taken, the Party quickly took concrete action. A document was prepared, which stated that, as contact with the government had been fruitless, it was time to voice to ‘a general, powerful and extensive peoples opinion’ in order to get an actual response to the demands. Such an action, ‘encompassing the whole country’ and coming from ‘the deep ranks of the people’, would show the dissatisfaction with the lack of decisive action:

Now the time has come, which demands that major, well-planned demonstrations take to the streets, in which women and children in particular should participate, and that mass meetings be held, and that without end telegrams and petitions be sent to the government and the state food commission, so that the people’s demands be presented at every location, big as well as small, in the country. \(^{59}\)

Together with this call to action, a poster depicting the consequences of the expensive times was prepared and sent out to be placed in meeting rooms and public places around the country (Figure 1).

The party newspaper, Social-Demokraten, also printed extra issues raising the same demands, and Social Democratic members of parliament presented speeches, motions, and interpellations. \(^{60}\) This concerted effort, made in the autumn of 1915, a year and a half before the later renowned hunger demonstrations of 1917, showed that the Social Democrats were carrying out extensive opinion activities related to the hunger situation before 1917.

The following year, the food situation deteriorated and members demanded more decisive activities. Letters came from many parts of the country. In 1916, the Malmö workers’ commune approached the Party board with a suggestion that ‘a general demonstration against the government policies regarding the high cost of living should be organized on a particular day over the whole country’. The party board again declined taking the lead in organising such demonstrations because of previous decisions and again referred to the upcoming 1 May demonstrations. \(^{61}\) The workers’ commune in Gothenburg urged the Party board to organize a ‘citizen march’ in Stockholm to protest against the food situation, with representatives from all the unions around the country. Creating a more ostentatious expression of opinion would emphasize the demands that more had to be done about the food situation. \(^{62}\) Similar demands came from Malmberget, an iron-producing municipality in the far north, where a public meeting had agreed on the need for the Party board or the union leadership to ‘head a powerful opinion movement’ against the high cost of living. \(^{63}\)

Partly in response to such demands, a large ‘Congress concerning the high cost of living’ was organized in Stockholm in December 1916. At this congress, various speakers, both experts and Social Democratic Members of Parliament, discussed how the high costs of living affected the population. Special attention was given to different types of food items, but the costs for housing and fuel were also debated. The congress resulted in a joint statement, with demands put forward to the government. \(^{64}\) The liberal paper
Dagens Nyheter presented the congress as a ‘Parliament of the consumers’ and in headlines stated that it represented the general discontent with the situation.65

As the above presentation of Social Democratic opinion activities shows, the Party was keenly aware of the food situation in 1915 and 1916, and the dialogue with demands from grass root members led to manifestations against the high cost of living. Demonstrations were organized in many places around the country and the Party produced pamphlets and posters with a coordinated message to be used. They also set up meetings with government representatives, organized a press campaign, and highlighted the issue in parliament. Based on strategic communicative concerns, the leadership performed a balancing act, trying to maximize the output from existing resources, which meant initially holding back on large-scale events and instead using pre-existing structures such as May 1 demonstrations. As a whole, the concerted efforts amounted to a coherent opinion campaign, in which the Party employed the
organizational powers available and made use of a range of different media forms within the media system to promote their central message.

The food riots of 1917 and the Social Democratic response
As the Social Democrats were well underway with opinion activities related to the food situation, how did they react when news of the first hunger marches broke? Such eruptions of protests could be interpreted as signs that the Russian Revolution had come to Sweden, and that the food protests taking place in St Petersburg had now gained a Swedish counterpart. The food protests came at a time when political debate on suffrage and reports from developments in Russia were at the forefront. On 16 April, the party newspaper, Social-Demokraten, ran a front-page report on ‘The workers conference in Petrograd’, while an article inside the paper on the same day called the negative response to suffrage extension ‘A punch in the face of the Swedish people’ and, with a hint at radicalization, stated that ‘the struggle now must turn to other means’. Domestic developments and the revolutionary process abroad were intertwined.

The first public uprisings, called ‘food marches’, related to food prices in 1917, took place in the municipality of Västervik, in which a group of women marched on 11 April to demand larger bread rations and reasonable prices. On 14 April 1917, more workers marched to discuss their plight with the authorities. A renewed march on 16 April led to a call to strike and representatives for different union and political groups produced a joint statement. However, syndicalists wanted those assembled to go on strike, which the union members opposed. A compromise was reached and the communication to the employers demanding increased pay to compensate for rising prices ended with a ‘softer’ threat, stating they would put ‘all the force’ that they were ‘in possession of’ behind the demands.

The Västervik uprising not only displayed a lack of unity among the Left in how to react to such a spontaneous event, but also generated a template for this kind of demonstration, which contained a series of typical actions, and an involvement with different media types. A physical march to meet with authorities related to the food situation would be followed by a meeting and a resolution that summarized demands. This had long been a typical template for socialist gatherings, which excelled at producing meeting resolutions with the participants’ signatures. The demand put forward to the employers in this case requested a reply to be sent to the ‘Committee of 16 April’, care of the local paper, Småländs folkblad, indicating that news organizations were involved from the start. The resolution from the committee contained a call to action for ‘All Swedish workers’ to follow the lead and support the demands. From the beginning, the Left could not find a common view to share when it came to approaching the food situation. The Stockholm Social Democrats wanted to channel the outburst into orderly demands, whereas the southern branch of the Party and the syndicalists wanted more decisive actions and strikes.

In the following period, numerous similar manifestations took place all over the country. On 19 April, Dagens Nyheter reported that ‘The hunger movement is spreading’. On 20 April, headlines stated ‘Stockholm facing hunger unrest’ and the following day’s headlines read ‘New expressions of food unrest’. The national
newspapers gave these events ample coverage. The steady flow of reports about food manifestations created the impression of a wildfire, a national movement which was presented and read in the context of the revolution in Petrograd. Successive names of cities and municipalities filled the pages, and most accounts followed similar formats. In these accounts, the national papers often dutifully noted the different expressions the manifestation took, mentioning statements, actions, rituals, and other mediating characteristics of each manifestation.

On 21 April, 10 days after the first demonstration, the Social Democrats in Stockholm decided to make their mark on the hunger movement and swiftly set up a major manifestation in Stockholm. This was centrally organized in the sense that information was disseminated that there was to be a meeting in front of the parliament. In accordance with directives regarding public events, the police also had to be notified beforehand. According to newspaper accounts, up to 10,000 demonstrators showed up. The format was typical, with a public meeting, speech, presentation of a statement, the forming of a committee, and a promise of continued action to gain traction for the demands. The media coverage was an important part of the event. Several newspapers put the news of the manifestation on their front page, and picked up specific media observations, such as that the police wanted people to move to 'make room for the photographers'. Just as with strikes in earlier years, the news media contributed to the dissemination of the demonstrators’ demands, as it reprinted verbatim large parts of the speeches as well as the statement of demands.

Reports also noted the strong impression made by the singing of socialist songs such as ‘Internationalen’ and ‘Arbetets söner’ in front of the solemn parliamentary building. Singing these songs and carrying socialist flags and banners were ritualized activities at workers’ meetings, and were repeated at many of the demonstrations around the country. Special attention in the coverage was paid to how the meeting had come about, and a Stockholm daily reporter tried to answer the question of ‘How the signal to the demonstration went out’ through a detailed account of its swift organization. The paper considered the turnout especially ‘impressive considering the short preparation time’.

Cinematic representations of the demonstrations also became part of the coverage. In this period, it was common to produce ‘journal films’, short newsreels that were displayed at cinemas before the longer films. Newsreels with reports from the First World War greatly increased the interest in this media form. The manifestation before the Swedish Parliament, as well as a subsequent demonstration for ‘Bread and suffrage’ in Södertälje, just outside of Stockholm, were captured in such films. Advertisements in newspapers then highlighted these events as part of the journal films. Through the movement of content between different media forms, events which were originally politically motivated gained wider impact through the coverage by other media, which were separate from the originators of the event.

The relation between newspaper coverage and journal films also illustrates the interaction between different instances within the media system. The makers of journal films were independent entities, and, in terms of central control over the message, Social Democrats had little say over the presentation in these journal films. Although the Social Democratic Party apparatus had developed an extensive communication system with reach all over the country and acted based on explicit agitation strategies,
these structures still had their limitations, as they represented only a part of the whole national media system. Messages could be – and were, of course – appropriated, reformulated, and re-distributed by other actors with other agendas.

This is evident from how newspapers differed in their perspective of the hunger demonstrations and, in particular, in their assessment of whether the demonstrations were legal or justified. The socialist paper Arbetet in Malmö called the hunger demonstration of 25 April ‘grand and dignified’, and Social-Demokraten labelled manifestations in Västerås and Norrköping ‘impressive’. Stockholms-Tidningen said that demonstrations ‘in all places’ were characterized by ‘a calm and dignified attitude’, whereas the conservative Stockholms Dagblad called the manifestations in Västervik ‘Russian manners’ and claimed that workers had behaved in a threatening way.

On some occasions, violence erupted as people sought to buy food outside of their rations, and business owners felt threatened. Worker-friendly papers treated these events as outliers, and labelled those who stirred up the commotion as troublemakers, whereas those less friendly to the workers’ movement saw such occurrences as typical of the movement’s lack of responsible behaviour.

Spontaneity and the risk of violence

Despite the hunger demonstrations being in line with the plan made by the Social Democrats in the preceding years, the movement was still presented as ‘spontaneous’, as something that stemmed from the grass roots. Although researchers have concluded that the Social Democrats centrally coordinated a number of hunger demonstrations towards the end of April, which presented identical resolutions, the leader of the party, Hjalmar Branting, still maintained in public interviews that the hunger movement was spontaneous. In a statement made to the British newspaper The Daily Chronicle, he emphasized that the demonstrations had been conducted ‘without any joint agreement between involved organizations’. In his memoirs, Leftist politician Zeth Höglund repeats the same assessment that the hunger manifestations, which he labelled a ‘potato revolution’, ‘erupted spontaneously’ around the country.

This focus on spontaneity is worth noting, as the national breadth of the protests mirrored the wide reach of the Social Democratic Party across the nation. In a technical sense, the large Stockholm manifestation was more spontaneous than, for example, the annual 1 May demonstrations, and had been set up in a more improvized manner. But the very synchronization of communication events had previously been consciously used to reinforce the impression of a peoples’ movement. Perhaps at this time, as the Left was not in unity, maintaining that the events were spontaneous instead strengthened the image of a true national grass roots movement. This reasoning mirrors arguments made in other contexts, in which the appearance of an extensive organization could detract from the impression that a public opinion was true or authentic. If the expression of opinion seemed to be the product of careful planning, it would come across as fabricated and as the adopted voice of narrow special interests.

By presenting the hunger movement as spontaneous, Social Democrats could avoid this type of accusation, but also come out on top, all whilst being perceived as the responsible and serious party, holding back more extreme demands.

On a central level, the Social Democrats had, in 1915, initiated a campaign against the high cost of living, while turning down repeated suggestions that the Party should
centrally organize nationwide manifestations. In dealing with the manifestations taking place all over the country, based on initiatives from a variety of factors, they now focused on the need for orderliness. Social Democrats wanted reform, but they also, in line with Kautskyite principles, wanted to work through established channels. Channelling the protests through formats that were established made it easier to maintain order and avoid losing control to violent elements. The 1 May demonstrations of 1917 are an important example of this consideration. At a meeting of the executive committee of the Party on 29 April 1917, Hjalmar Branting informed that the Swedish prime minister had asked if the party could be responsible for maintaining order in connection with the 1 May demonstrations. There were concerns that the day would not pass quietly. Branting had replied that overly extensive security measures would serve as a provocation. The prime minister had also remarked that, if the Party could bear the responsibility, the public security measures could then be held to a minimum. The executive committee decided to accept the responsibility, under the condition that the police remained composed and acted in no way provocatively, no matter what the masses were shouting. At that same meeting, Herman Lindqvist informed those gathered that Landsorganisationen had invited the executive committee to a joint meeting the next day because of the ‘situation created by the hunger demonstrations’. The workers’ movement was on high alert and closely monitored the question of orderliness. An advert announcing the practicalities of the 1 May demonstrations in 1917 called out the official stance of the Party: ‘WORKERS! Do not let yourselves be provoked from any direction. Only reactionary forces are served by riots. Our May demonstration shall correspond to our dignity!’

The theme of the 1 May demonstration was ‘For peace, against the War and the high cost of living’. The subsequent coverage emphasized that the demonstrations had been characterized by ‘A huge turnout and impressive calm’. Also, non-socialist papers mentioned the lack of disturbances. Stockholms-Tidningen headlined that no police activity had been necessary. Even the Right-wing Stockholms Dagblad, which had recognized the efforts of Branting to hold a ‘calming’ speech during the April manifestation, noted in a headline that the workers’ demonstrations had concluded in a calm and orderly manner. The paper also gave ample coverage to the competing event, organized by conservative interests, the ‘citizen feast’ held at an outdoor folklore museum, which it claimed had had 12,000 participants. In relation to the hunger demonstrations, which engaged a total of 300,000 participants spread out over close to 150 events, the claimed number of participants on 1 May 1917 in Stockholm, Malmö, and Gothenburg was 135,000, of which 100,000 was in Stockholm.

An additional reason why the Social Democrats may have been less eager to organize further hunger demonstrations, outside of the regular communication agenda, was that there were other pressing internal issues within the Party. One may sense frustration from the more radical youth part of the Party that the mother party was doing too little. The 1917 annual report of the youth organization complained about the lack of engagement by the mother party in the hunger demonstrations. The spontaneous demonstrations had not led to changes, ‘due to lack of effective leadership’, which the party could have provided. The youth branch of the Party had then turned to the country secretariat with a request that it should organize the mass movement in order to achieve some minimum
demands. The reply had been dismissive. To make sure the issue moved forward, the youth branch took action on their own. In May, they participated in a joint meeting with other organizations from the Left, such as the syndicalists, The Central Organization of Swedish Workers, and the Party of Young Socialists, as well as the Swedish Union Opposition. In addition to exploring options for organizing actions on their own, the goal could also have been to increase pressure on the mother party to take more radical steps.

**Political outcomes of the food manifestations**

The manifestations in Stockholm on 21 April and the ensuing 1 May demonstrations were signs that the Social Democratic communication efforts were ramping up. On the back of the big demonstration in Stockholm, Hjalmar Branting presented an interpellation in parliament, asking Prime Minister Swartz if he was prepared to initiate a constitutional reform instituting general suffrage rights. The prime minister replied that, as elections were to be held in the autumn, the question would be postponed until then. Social Democrats were anything but happy with this reply and claimed that delaying constitutional reform would make the upcoming election battle dangerously sharp and confrontational.

This fear was undoubtedly real, and it became successively difficult to channel the revolutionary momentum into legal reforms and stability. One reason was the vocal criticism of the reformist route coming from former high-profile Social Democrats such as Ivan Vennerström and Zeth Höglund. They chose to start the breakout Swedish Social Democratic Left Party, and when Swartz in parliament had refused to recognize demands for extended suffrage, Höglund exclaimed it was time for the masses to take matters into their own hands and activate the ‘parliament of the streets’.

At a two-day meeting on 20–22 May 1917, the Social Democratic Party board discussed how to handle the situation. The interpellations presented to the government had contained not-so-subtle hints about the events in Russia as a possible precursor to what could happen in Sweden if no reforms ensued. In the discussion of the Party board, the Editor of the Social Democratic newspaper *Folket*, Carl Emil Svensson, noted that they had to be prepared if the requests for reform were turned down entirely. A negative reply would lead to ‘major movements among the people, primarily cessations of work’. He asked: ‘Will you gentlemen sit with your arms crossed while others take the lead? There has been a profound change in the minds of people. The Russian Revolution is giving birth to something among the oppressed of the nature that if you do not take the lead, chaos will follow’. A similar stance was taken by Rickard Sandler, who emphasized the international dimension:

The course of events here will depend on what happens in the world, not least on what may happen in Germany. The revolution will not come, nor can it be prevented, by decisions by the party board. The revolution in Russia was not made, it came. What matters is being able to rise to the occasion.

These statements from the Party board indicate that they were expecting the sentiments from the revolutionary events and hunger demonstrations to have a lasting
impact on the political climate. This also was evident from the communication activities launched in connection with the upcoming elections. In the campaigns for the autumn elections, Social Democrats mobilized major resources, including the distribution of several hundred thousand copies of a pamphlet by Carl Emil Svensson about how Social Democrats had handled the hunger situation.  

Although the election results were a partial failure, as the Social Democratic Party failed to make ground in parliament, the outcome indicated that Leftist winds were blowing, with the conservatives losing a significant number of seats in parliament, and the new Social Democratic Party of the Left capturing many seats. The liberal Nils Edén was tasked with forming a government and soon, against the backdrop of continuing pressure from revolutionary events in Russia and Finland, proposed voting rights for women and extending suffrage to all men with a minimum income.  

As Pasi Ihalainen has shown, the reformist stance of Swedish Social Democrats was strong, and the Finnish Civil War of 1918 further strengthened the conviction that revolutionary changes had to come via parliament, not by violent forces. The political changes after the spring of 1917 are thus a testament to how the transnational revolutionary forces intertwined the developments in the countries of Scandinavia and Finland. In this development the media played a central role. With their established communicative structures, and strategic balancing of opinion pressures towards the goal of maintaining stability, the Social Democrats put their mark on the Swedish response to the revolutionary events in Russia.

Conclusions
This article has sought to provide a communicative perspective on how the Swedish Social Democrats reacted to the events of 1917, in particular the hunger demonstrations. The key research questions were: (1) How the Social Democratic Party used combinations of different media forms available in the media system to forward their agenda in the period 1915–1917; (2) Which communicative structures and practices the Swedish Social Democratic Party had in place as the transnational revolutionary events and national hunger demonstrations of 1917 unfolded; and (3) How the response by the Social Democratic Party to the hunger manifestations and transnational revolutionary events related to existing communicative strategies and practices. The study was based on the interpretative framework of media systems, and aimed to show how a combination of media forms were employed in a historical situation in which impetus for transnational revolution had to be integrated into the existing practices.

A key result of the first question is the extent to which the Social Democratic response to hunger manifestations was part of a multi-year opinion campaign against the high cost of living, beginning as early as 1915. The fact that the Social Democratic Party did not initiate the specific demonstrations in April 1917 was not due to a lack of attention to the food issue, but rather a result of a strategic consideration to channel discontent into regular communication structures of the Party, with focus on 1 May demonstrations. This was an example of a revisionist tactic, opposed to the stance of the far Left, which advocated direct action. An important reason for the course taken was that maintaining orderliness, which was paramount, could be accomplished more easily. Economic reasons for this decision were also forwarded.
Regarding the second question, the study shows that, by 1917, the Social Democratic Party had established a vast array of media channels and formats over which the Party centrally had control, amounting to a system in which coordinated messages could be distributed on short notice and national opinion campaigns launched both proactively and reactively as situations arose. These communicative practices were first put in place when the party was founded, and then continually adapted and expanded in the first decades of the 20th century through the inclusion of new techniques, tactics, and experiences. Given the high degree of central control, beginning with the creation of the central ‘Committee for agitation’ in 1894, one could ask whether the communication structure of the Party should be labelled a media system in itself? The answer would have to be no, as the communication efforts were still carried out within the larger national media system, and constrained by legal, financial, and other factors on the national level.

Regarding the third question, the study has detailed how, when the hunger demonstrations erupted, the communication structure of the Party absorbed the challenge, and the central organs of the Party adapted the response through strategic decisions based on long-term goals. When confronted with the dynamics of the spring of 1917, the strategic agitation organization of the communication of the Social Democrats created a totality through enactment, media representations, and the recirculation of these representations. In this totality, socialist ideology and emphasis on agitation was integrated with a skilful use of the available means of communication within the larger media system of the time. The starting point of the hunger demonstrations may not have been decided by the Social Democrats, but they went along with the initiative, focusing on responsibility and orderly political change. Through their long-standing discussions and previous activities related to the food situation, the workers’ movement was on alert to connect a movement such as the hunger demonstrations to their pre-existing ideological agenda and established methods for agitation.

The added value of the concept of a historical media system has been to highlight how actors, through strategic efforts, can activate a range of media expressions to forward their agenda. In the case of the Social Democratic reaction to the hunger situation, the circulation of key arguments in many different media forms contributed to the impression of a strong national opinion for reform, putting pressure on the king and the parliament. When arguments saturate many parts of the media system, opinion pressure can reach a tipping point. In this interpretation, the revolutionary opinion in the country during the spring of 1917 and the ensuing political changes also reflected conscious media management strategies of the Left in the context of a transnational revolutionary moment.

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Notes

1. A line of research touching on similar questions but from different perspectives concern the history of election campaigning, of which the Social Democrats were an important part. Esaiasson, Svenska valkampanjer 1866-1988.
3. Andræ, Revolt eller reform.
4. Sejersted, Socialdemokratin tidsälder.
5. Åkerberg at Meeting of the Social Democratic party board, 22 May 1917, 22.
6. Elvander, Skandinavisk arbetarrörelse, 42.
7. Alapuro, State and Revolution in Finland.
8. The invitation was reported by Social-Demokraten on 11 January 1917.
11. Hirdman, Vi bygger landet.
12. Blomqvist, Potatisrevolutionen; Andræ, Revolt eller reform; Nyström, Hungerupproret 1917.
15. Wolf, Tigande diktare?
22. Scholars from the project EMHIS have recently, with inspiration from the histoire croisée tradition, argued that transnational and transmedial case studies could be fruitfully interpreted as entangled. See Cronqvist and Hilgert, ‘Entangled Media Histories’.
27. Andra socialdemokratiska partikongressen Norrköping 17-20 maj 1891, 15–16.
30. Jönsson and Snickars, Medier & politik.
32. Svenska socialdemokratiens tredje partikongress i Göteborg den 23, 24, 25, 26 mars 1894, 10–11, 23.
36. Ibid, 204.
37. Ibid, 39.
39. Ibid, 41.
40. Ibid, 46.
41. Ibid, 47.
42. Ibid, 55–6.
44. Minutes of the party board, 1 February 1916, §2. In Germany, a party press bureau was started in 1908, catering to social democratic newspapers. Ross, *Media and the Making of Modern Germany*.
47. Snickars, ‘*Storstrejken 1909 – en mediehistoria*’.
48. Langkjaer, *Övervakning för rikets säkerhet*, 70. This was a counter development to that of, for example, Germany, where anti-socialist laws were abolished in 1890. To curb the development of socialism in Germany, conservative and Right-wing interests instead started the Imperial League against Social Democracy, which supported newspapers and produced pamphlets. Ross, *Media and the Making of Modern Germany*.
49. Langkjaer, *Övervakning för rikets säkerhet*, 70.
52. Frieburger, ‘*War Prosperity and Hunger*’.
53. *Colonist*, 24 April 1917, ‘*Food Shortage in Sweden*’.
54. Larsson, ‘*Krig, krizer och tillväxt*’.
55. Blomberg, ‘*Revolutionary Outsiders in Sweden*’.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid., 47, 49.
59. Ibid., 14–15.
60. Ibid., 9–49.
63. Ibid. Letter from citizens of Malmberget to the party board, 1 October 1916.
64. Thorberg, *Dyrtidskongressen 1916; Social-Demokraten*, ‘*Den stora dyrtidskongressen*’, 30 December 1916.
66. *Social-Demokraten*, 16 April 1917.
67. Västervik was not without activity from the Social Democratic Party. The annual report for 1915 had listed, among other things, a study circle, led by G. Jansson, with 12 members, and the party magazine *Tiden* listed 15 subscribers in Västervik the same year. *Socialdemokratiska partistyrelsens berättelse för år 1915*, 115, 128.
70. *Dagens Nyheter*, 22 April 1917.
71. Ibid.
72. Rohdin, ‘När kriget kom till Sverige’.
74. Cinemas included the topics of the journal films in their adverts. ‘The demonstration outside Parliament’ is specifically mentioned by the cinema Imperial, and the advertisement for the cinema Sibyllan references ‘Saturdays demonstration in Stockholm’. *Dagens Nyheter*, 28 April 1917.
75. *Arbetet*, 26 April 1917; *Social-Demokraten*, 21 April 1917.
76. *Stockholms-Tidningen*, 22 April 1917; *Stockholms Dagblad*, 17 April 1917.
77. Andræ, *Revolt eller reform*.
81. Meeting of the executive committee of the Social Democratic party, 29 April 1917, §74.
82. Ibid., §73.
83. *Social-Demokraten*, 1 May 1917.
84. Ibid., 2 May 1917.
86. *Stockholms Dagblad*, 22 April 1917.
87. Ibid., 2 May 1917.
91. Ibid., 50.
93. Meeting of the Social Democratic party board, 22 May 1917, 19.
94. Ibid, 23.
95. Svensson, *Socialdemokratin och livsmedelspolitiken*.

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