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Challenges of Securing the Industrial Internet of Things Value Chain

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Abstract—We see a shift from today's Internet-of-Things (IoT) to include more industrial equipment and metrology systems, forming the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). However, this leads to many concerns related to confidentiality, integrity, availability, privacy and non-repudiation. Hence, there is a need to secure the IIoT in order to cater for a future with smart grids, smart metering, smart factories, smart cities, and smart manufacturing. It is therefore important to research IIoT technologies and to create order in this chaos, especially when it comes to securing communication, resilient wireless networks, protecting industrial data, and safely storing industrial intellectual property in cloud systems. This research therefore presents the challenges, needs, and requirements of industrial applications when it comes to securing IIoT systems.

Index Terms—Security, IoT, IIoT, Industry 4.0, vulnerabilities, trust, metering, metrology, application, end-device

I. INTRODUCTION

Today we can observe large global trends in the digitalization of all aspects of our everyday life. In particular, we see applications that can utilize information from sensors attached to things in order to provide more personalized, automatized, and intelligent behavior. This concept is commonly referred to as the Internet-of-Things (IoT) [1]. IoT is a collective term for the development of machinery, vehicles, goods, appliances, clothes, etc. to become equipped with small embedded sensors and actuators that can also communicate among each other over the Internet. This means that these devices can perceive their surroundings, communicate with others, have situational behavior, and create new forms of smart, intelligent, and autonomous services [2]. This development is not only important for a digitalized and connected society, but also for the industry and the economy as a whole. Current estimations claim that there will be over 50 billion connected devices on the Internet as soon as year 2020 and many of these devices will be sensors, actuators, and small computers [3], [4]. All these IoT devices will together create new types of services by sharing sensor information ubiquitously between each other on a global scale and controlling different types of actuators. Thus, heavily relying on metrology systems to acquire the sensor information [5]. From this we also see trends in IoT cloud computing for large scale data storage [6], big data analytics on massive amount of gathered data from IoT sources [7], and incorporation of cyber-physical systems into machine to machine (M2M) systems [8]. In

relation to this, there is much work being done in the Industry 4.0 initiative [9], including smart cities, smart industry, factories of the future, and smart manufacturing. Furthermore, as Industry 4.0 catching a faster pace than ever imagined industrial automation is not only getting smarter by using artificial intelligence methods, but also freeing itself from wired components by exploiting wireless technology. This is being possible by employing IIoT in a standardized fashion and seeking technological breakthrough from industrial automation researchers. Hence, forming the need for research in Industrial IoT (IIoT) [10]. However, the industrial demands are quite different from non IIoT services, especially when it comes to time criticalness and reliability [11]. For example, an industrial process might have to react quickly to small changes in the sensor values to maintain a high quality of the product or to avoid a catastrophic failure. Because of this, industrial communication systems often consider a five nines availability [12], [13], meaning an uptime of at least 99.999%. Industrial applications and IIoT have much higher security demands, to avoid downtime and to protect sensitive information related to the industrial process. Including protecting the networks from denial of service attacks, data protection and privacy of the sensitive industrial data, and timely updates to avoid weakness exploitation by different on-line attacks. It is this area that will be the focus of this paper where surveys and related works by Sadeghi *et al.* [14], Sicari *et al.* [15], Borgia *et al.* [16], and the references therein introduce and summarize the current state of the art well.

The overall goal of this research is to provide insights into securing the IIoT, with a particular focus on the IIoT value chain. Which ranges from sensor value generation and transmission over the Internet, to finally the cloud servers and end user applications. It is paramount important to solve and address security aspects of the IoT and IIoT, if this vision will expand beyond the simple applications we see today. To achieve these, the research needs to be built up on the existing works in security guidelines, industrial security frameworks, secure-by-design principles for ecosystems, secure remote code execution, homomorphic encryption, and software guard extensions. Hence, the purpose is to investigate the disadvantages and limitations of the cloud based approaches current in use. An additional purpose of this research is to present a more viable and future proof approach. Finally, this project will aid in establishing a critical mass in IoT and IIoT research to increase the awareness, completeness, and extensiveness of




Fig. 1. An overview of a typical IIoT value chain and highlighted challenging areas related to security

the IIoT security research. Even though security in industrial systems and the IoT have been investigated for some time now, this brings novelty to the field with its holistic view of the IIoT value chain and by securing both the devices and the industrial data within the actual IIoT systems. Hence, the research work presented in this paper seeks to answer the following two research questions:

- 1) What requirements can be identified and highlighted, to show security and trust challenges on a holistic point of view in all the steps of an industry value chain that includes an IIoT and measurement system.
- 2) Which upcoming security research areas are most important for the proliferation of Industry 4.0 and the IIoT, and what are the major obstacles to focus future work on?

From these two research questions, our contribution in this paper is to highlight and illuminate problems, challenges, and the issues when securing the IIoT. Hence, this article will only provide an overview of the problems and short explanations of possible solutions, since solving these problems still are ongoing research.

The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Section II outlines and presents the challenges that have been identified that the IIoT is facing, split into five highlighted areas. Section III presents a use case study on how these challenges can appear in a typical IIoT scenario. Finally, Section IV presents our conclusions and directions for future work.

II. SECURING THE IIoT VALUE CHAIN

The IIoT Value Chain can be illustrated in many different ways, depending on the type of industry. One simplified and holistic view of the a typical IIoT value chain can be seen in Figure 1. This figure will be used in this research as a basis for understanding where the challenges, research problems, and implementation issues exists. Hence, this figure shows

the IIoT devices such as industrial sensors and actuators. The IIoT networks, consisting of both communication networks, site local servers and gateways. The IIoT cloud, forming a back-end system for the IIoT data. The end user applications, such as monitor applications, business logic systems, and process management systems. Finally, all parts of the IIoT value chain can be vulnerable to different types of malicious attacks. The remainder of this section will present details on some of the identified challenges in each of these areas.

A. IIoT System Model Security Challenges

The first identified challenge was to investigate the security demands in IIoT systems and to define a general model for evaluating security of the IIoT. Including mathematical models, evaluating metrics, and needed measurements. Resulting in a concrete list of IIoT demands and requirements based on information from actual problem owners and an evaluation model to assess the security of different IIoT systems. There is a need to collect, compile, and relate all the gathered results from a holistic point of view. With the intention of creating a set of guidelines for secure IIoT systems and their communication. Because of this, actual problem owners are an integral part of solving these challenges, because they can provide vital information on the state of the industry that can otherwise be very difficult to survey from an academic perspective. There is a need for creating a set of guidelines and instructions for how industries can secure their value chains, securing their devices, and securing their cloud systems. Hence, there is a need to survey previous work and existing security guidelines, industrial security frameworks and secure-by-design principles for ecosystems. Highlight the impact and importance of secure IIoT systems. Modeling the parameters that has impact on the security of IIoT systems in terms securing devices, communication, and cloud systems.

1 To finally, compiling related work and results into a set of
2 guidelines for how industries can secure their IIoT value
3 chains.

4 *B. IIoT End-Device Security Challenges*

5 One must also take the device themselves into consideration,
6 because securing devices that a malicious person have might
7 have access to is extremely difficult. Since all application layer
8 security mechanisms require some form of key management,
9 storing the keys and handling them in a secure way becomes
10 paramount. It is also not uncommon to see hard-coded keys
11 or group keys systems on IoT devices, where a single com-
12 promised device can compromise the whole systems security.
13 One must always take into consideration that the devices are
14 put into untrusted environments, both from a physical and
15 logical point of view. Even if we protect our industrial sites
16 with walls, barbed wire and virtual private network systems. A
17 single breach of any of these systems, be it physical or logical,
18 takes an attacker inside the protected system and has access to
19 the device. There are many examples of extracting keys from
20 devices if one has access to the physical device, for example
21 physical side channel attacks, tampering, reverse engineering,
22 power/electromagnetic analysis, timing attacks, known fault
23 attacks, and clock glitches.

24 One common approach through history is to ensure device
25 security through obscurity. Which is also surprisingly easy to
26 break, given access to the device. One example is how Mifare
27 Classic RFID cards, which are still used for bus cards and
28 access cards, were reverse engineered and exploited. In detail,
29 researchers could reverse engineer the cipher by analysis of
30 the integrated circuit (IC) architecture under microscope [17].
31 Thus seeing the structure of the IC gates and could reconstruct
32 the cipher from that. Another clear example of device security
33 problems is problems related to timing [18]. Where an other-
34 wise secure algorithm can still be broken by physical access to
35 the device, because of poor or unthoughtful programming. For
36 example, a simple 8 character password check implemented as
37 a for loop checking character by character for matches, can be
38 timed for each pass or fail to reduce the brute force complexity
39 from for example 256^8 tries to $256 * 8 = 2048$ tries.

40 Finally, one must investigate what the implications of com-
41 promised device are. Sometimes a single compromised devices
42 cannot perform much harm by itself, but the fact that one
43 device have been compromised means that the others are
44 vulnerable as well. There is also the threat of using multiple
45 compromised devices as botnets, which from an industrial
46 point of view can have serious impact. For example if the
47 device prioritizes down vital sensing, because they are actively
48 taking part in botnet activities instead.

49 *C. IIoT Network Security Challenges*

50 Network Security is a challenging task, especially for an
51 IIoT, owing to the heterogeneous network architecture with
52 multiple network components using different hardware and
53 software implementations. Additionally, the wireless commu-
54 nications medium of IIoT introduces extra vulnerability and

open venue for wide range of attacks from passive attacks
such as eavesdropping, to more advanced active attacks such
as jamming. There are various vendors producing plethora of
devices that can be employed under IIoT. Therefore, network
security of IIoT is often achieved by custom proposals rather
than generic ones. For instance, in LoRaWAN which is a pro-
prietary Low Power Wide Area Network (LPWAN) application
that has the highest market dominance at the moment, security
of the network is achieved by issuing a well-known symmetric
key cryptography algorithm i.e. AES128 [19]. The distribution
and management of the keys is a very customized solution
and open to enhancements. For example, there is a drastically
change in the versions of LoRaWAN v1.0 and v1.1, in terms
of number of session keys as well as the secret lifetime keys.
This proves that future network security solutions for IIoT will
be more customized rather than being generic ones. It can be
stated that the network security of an IIoT system should be
custom tailored, according to the vulnerabilities of that specific
IIoT system along with the trust metrics of the network and
depending on the security requirements of the IIoT system
managers and the users. As in the case of industrial automation
and control domains, the resulting security design of an IIoT
system should be dynamic, where security level of the design
could be improved at will via updates with patch distribution
or with version updates [20].

26 *D. IIoT Cloud Security Challenges*

27 IoT and IIoT are exploring the benefits of Cloud and
28 Cloud-based-services, it is inevitable to think Cloud to be an
29 extended part of these networks. However, adoption of Cloud
30 by IIoT will bring plenty of new security challenges especially
31 in data management, access control, identity management,
32 complexity scaling, compliance issues, legal issues, and last
33 but not least, emerging Cloud decentralization [21]. Therefore,
34 security solutions that are devised for IIoT need to consider
35 the Cloud extension as well. For example a security plane
36 for Cloud-based-services should be used at the front-end IoT
37 devices and can be employed as an interface between the IIoT
38 and the Cloud [22]. In Cloud supported IIoT systems, not
39 only forward secrecy of the user data stored at the Cloud
40 is important, but also the backwards non-traceability of the
41 end devices from the stored data at the Cloud. Therefore,
42 a security plane can effectively be leveraged to take on
43 several security services such as authentication, access control,
44 etc., for assuring privacy of user data stored at the Cloud
45 and security of IIoT devices at the same time. The Cloud
46 systems also need to employ functions for high scalability,
47 good redundancy, multiple network connections, and failsafe
48 systems. So that if parts of the Cloud systems fails or becomes
49 under attack, the system should still function good enough to
50 maintain the service level agreements to avoid catastrophic
51 failures in the IIoT applications.

52 *E. IIoT Application Security Challenges*

53 According to the Open Web Application Security Project
54 (OWASP) a list of top 10 vulnerabilities that can influence

1 the IIoT security has been announced in [23]. The following
2 challenges and countermeasures, *directly related to the IIoT*
3 *application security*, have been split into two categories,
4 application interface and malicious software.

5 To attain a secure web interface, it needs to prohibit weak
6 passwords process and have a lockout mechanism, both tempo-
7 rary and permanent, after certain number of unsuccessful trials.
8 The interface must be biased to strong passwords registration
9 side by side to force password restarting after a certain time-
10 period. Security credentials such as user-name and password,
11 should be available for updates. In addition, a mechanism of
12 multi-factor authentication should be deployed where possible.
13 Furthermore, password recovery solutions have to be available
14 in case of forgetting the present password. There is also a need
15 to check the web applications against certain vulnerabilities,
16 such as Cross-site Scripting (XSS), SQL Injection (SQLi), and
17 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks. These three are
18 the most common web application vulnerabilities nowadays
19 and they are related to the web application development.
20 Hence, secure coding must be considered accordingly when
21 creating the web applications. HTTPS (HTTP Secure) needs
22 to be presented to protect the exchanged data on all IIoT
23 applications, as well as firewalls need to be present to restrict
24 global access of the web interfaces.

25 Malicious software or Malware as a short, refer to a range
26 of forms of aggressive or destructive software, for example
27 but not limited, worms, Trojan horses, spyware, viruses, and
28 much more. It worth to mention Mirai worm [24] which is
29 a malware that turns connected devices over Linux platform
30 into controlled "bots" to launch large-scale botnet attacks. It
31 has been recruited in some of the highly disruptive distributed
32 denial of service (DDoS) attacks. The Mirai botnet was first
33 found in August 2016. It attacks on-line devices connected
34 to the Internet such as IP surveillance cameras, sensors and
35 actuators. It works by detecting weak IoT nodes with a
36 dictionary attack of predefined security login credentials to
37 log into these devices to infect them. Infected devices will
38 continue to work normally, except for some occasions when
39 it utilizes the IoT nodes resources to launch a DDoS attack.
40 It use a large number of IoT devices to bypass DoS anomaly
41 detection software which monitors the IP address of received
42 requests to block if it recognizes an irregular pattern.

43 *F. IIoT Trust Challenges*

44 This challenge is on securing sensitive industrial data in
45 the IIoT cloud systems. Including technologies for hiding
46 and protecting the sensitive industrial data, such as sensor
47 values, algorithms, and industrial process information. Fur-
48 thermore, the amount of collected personal information must
49 be restricted by a certain limit. Gathering of personal infor-
50 mation must be done over a secure communication channel.
51 Consumers should also be given an option for data is being
52 collected and what is required for certain processes. To further
53 complicate this, all this information will need to be stored
54 on different IIoT cloud systems where the system itself can
55 not be trusted. The sensitive industrial information must be

protected against compromising of the IIoT cloud or system
provider, as well as eavesdropping and reverse engineering.
In particular, there is need for research and development
of an encrypted computational component to perform secure
industrial processing in an insecure cloud environment. Hence,
there is a need to highlight how different cloud systems handle
trust for the IoT and IIoT. As well as proposing a method for
securing industrial information, sensor values, and algorithms
on IIoT systems where the system itself cannot be trusted.
Including evaluating the performance and the level of security
that different IIoT system providers can provide.

This challenge also includes trust issues with the IIoT
devices, such as issues with adding, removing, or changing
devices in the IIoT systems. The idea is that the IIoT should
be self-configuring, with little to no human intervention and
difficult setup. Which means there is a need for establishing
trust when new devices being added into an existing IIoT
system, to identify and deny potential malicious devices. There
is also a need to look into secure and automatic updates of
existing devices, to ensure all devices can be safely updated
when a new exploit is discovered and at the same time
avoid malicious software being pushed onto the devices. In
particular, a method for pushing verifiable updates to protected
devices through insecure channels is needed. In order to
perform large scale updating of secure industrial software
without physical interactions with the hardware. Hence, there
is a need for highlighting existing systems for securing IoT
devices, such secure remote code execution and software
guard extensions. As well as evaluating different methods
for pushing verifiable updates to protected devices through
insecure channels.

43 *G. Exploitation of IIoT System Vulnerabilities and Attacks*

IIoT network cyberattacks are very harmful as they can
make physical damage that could lead to human life loss. The
complex nature of the IIoT systems and the possible negative
consequences of cyberattacks can carry out and introduce
new threats. IIoT networks are susceptible to numerous types
of cyberattacks, including, node capture attack, side-channel
analysis, eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle, denial of service,
and much more. Unfortunately, traditional security solutions
cannot address IoT vulnerabilities due to the different nature of
the IIoT [14]. Node capture attack is a unique and challenging
attack for IIoT networks. It deals with the physical nodes. Ow-
ing to the spreading topology of the IIoT networks, physical
nodes usually run in unbounded and uncontrolled areas, which
makes it vulnerable to be captured effortlessly. Involving
tamper-resistant nodes is not a reliable solution as it increases
the network cost extremely. The detection of node capturing
can contribute to solving this tricky issue [25], [26]. Side-
channel analysis attack is based on the information that can be
recovered from the analysis of encryption/decryption apparatus
during the encryption/decryption process. These apparatuses
show timing and/or power consumption figures that could be
easily traced and determined. The gathered information could
led to discover the system security credentials i.e., shared




Fig. 2. An example of an IIoT installed factory with metering system




Fig. 3. An example of an IIoT natural gas metering system

1 session key, ciphering method. Keeping in mind that the IIoT
 2 nature makes it easier for the intruder to launch this sort
 3 of attack [27]. Eavesdropping is an action of listening in a
 4 live communication to gather information that could help the
 5 intruder to launch an attack accordingly. In the IIoT, which
 6 relays on wireless communication means, anyone can get an
 7 access to the medium to start eavesdropping. Confidentiality
 8 is the default security guard against eavesdropping condition
 9 that secure and reliable key establishment is guaranteed. It is
 10 well known to use implicit certificate to assure reliable key
 11 agreement for IIoT. In addition, when it comes to reaching
 12 a determined key lifetime a key revocation and/or re-keying
 13 mechanism needs to take place [28]. The Man-In-The-Middle
 14 (MITM) attack is one of the most famous attacks in network
 15 security generally, and in IIoT particularly. It is one of the
 16 major concerns for cybersecurity experts. MITM objects the
 17 real data that runs or exchanged between communication
 18 partners to eavesdrop, alter, modify, and falsify it [29]. Denial
 19 of Service (DoS) attacks, which are well-determined attempts,
 20 by a malicious party, to prohibit genuine users from reaching
 21 their network resources. It targets the system availability by
 22 heavily overwhelming the system resources to isolate it from
 23 its genuine users. This attack is very critical to IIoT networks
 24 as they are made up of constrained devices with very limited
 25 resources [30].

III. USE CASE EXAMPLES

27 Metrology measurements of the IIoT sensors working at
 28 critical infrastructures can be very important and even effect
 29 safety of human lives. As seen in many cases in the history;
 30 industrial sites have been targeted by hackers and subject to
 31 cyber-attacks, such as the Stuxnet incidence [31] in which
 32 SCADA systems of Iranian nuclear facilities effected with
 33 millions of dollars estimated property damage. These critical
 34 infrastructures may vary from bridges, tunnels to nuclear
 35 power plants and in this section we provide two specific
 36 examples from real life of automation world:

A. Factory Metering System

38 A real world factory process for creating minerals to be
 39 used in paper the paper industry, has much connected IIoT

equipment with sensors and actuators. Such as a verity of
 1 grinders, mixers, heaters, conveyor bands, see Figure 2. These
 2 IIoT sensors and actuators facilitates mainly three functions.
 3 Namely digitized on-the-go remote monitoring and control of
 4 equipment, optimization of machines within a production line
 5 due to collected process related data, and instant alarming for
 6 shutting-down of the equipment in the case of emergency situations.
 7 In this specific factory example, malicious adversaries
 8 can target these functions to bring great harm to the business.
 9 In this specific facility, especially heat and pressure sensors
 10 are highly critical. Any kind of outsider intervention might
 11 cause malfunctions, which eventually would end-up with not
 12 only batch and property damage, but also health hazards due to
 13 the unpreventable machine failures. Hence, there is a need for
 14 factory automation systems to take the challenges that have
 15 been highlighted in this article into consideration. In order
 16 to deploy sufficient cyber-security precautions to protect the
 17 business.
 18

B. Natural Gas Metering System

19 In Gas Pressure Reduction Stations (GPRS), an integrated
 20 metering system must be involved to measure the fuel con-
 21 sumption. It consists of a turbine meter, pressure transmitters
 22 and temperature transmitters, see Figure 3. These IIoT
 23 transmitters and meters are usually connected to each other
 24 over wireless HART/Profibus communicator to transfer their
 25 measurements to a remote flow computer. The turbine flow
 26 meter reading indicates the volume of the pressure and base
 27 temperature condition. The flow computer needs to receive
 28 very accurate values of the (line) pressure and temperature to
 29 be able to convert this base value to the real consumption.
 30 Accordingly, we need to be assured that the flow computer
 31 is receiving the accurate values of the line temperature, the
 32 line pressure as well as the base volume (turbine pulses) to
 33 calculate the real volume consumption. As any error in these
 34 calculations can lead to a huge financial loss, these systems
 35

1 need to consider the challenges that have been highlighted in
2 this article, to protect their business.

3 IV. CONCLUSIONS

4 This article explored the challenges of securing metrology
5 data for the IIoT, where we investigated seven areas
6 in particular. Namely the challenges in: IIoT system model
7 security, IIoT end device security, IIoT network security, IIoT
8 cloud security, IIoT application security, IIoT trust, and IIoT
9 attacks. In response to these, we have highlighted some of
10 the outstanding problems, the issues when creating real-life
11 implementations, and the research needed to solve this for a
12 future IIoT. As mentioned earlier, nowadays there is a demand
13 on custom security solutions: Rather than using generic
14 solutions, security experts are devising highly customized
15 security solutions for each network that is being designed.
16 This brings the advantages of rapid act on fixing the security
17 vulnerabilities of that specific network by releasing patches
18 timely manner and/or enhancing the security level in the next
19 release by closing all the gaps that are recognized. In this
20 context, IIoT systems security is projected to follow this trend
21 of customized approach in ensuring the security of IIoT value
22 chain. Hence, this brief summary of security measures along
23 with presented topics and ideas will help researchers not only
24 enhancing security-awareness in IIoT as a whole system but
25 also in securing its sub-components such as devices, networks,
26 clouds, and applications. In these areas there is much future
27 work left to be performed, which is why our own research
28 will primarily be focused on the following items:

- 29 1) Security requirement analysis of IIoT (obtaining vulner-
30 abilities list according to the various attack vectors).
- 31 2) Design of a customized security architecture for a con-
32 ceptual IIoT setup.
- 33 3) Theoretical and practical security analysis of the proposed
34 solution (customized security architecture).
- 35 4) Comparison of the proposed security solution to its' rivals
36 in the literature (if any).

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